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This Article will focus on two proposals to revise our federal income 
tax system, the Armey flat tax1 and the USA tax.2 Our goal is to 
compare these tax reform measures with our current Internal Revenue 
Code (Code) for income tax in three areas: (1) corporate stock 
1. H.R. 2060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 1050, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1995) (introduced by Rep. Armey and Sen. Shelby). · 
2. S. 722, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), (introduced by Sen. Nunn and Sen. 
Domenici). Other consumption-tax type proposals made in the past few sessions of 
Congress include (1) a National Retail Sales Tax, H.R. 3039, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
(1996); and (2) The Revenue Restructuring Act of 1996, H.R. 4050, 104th Cong., 2nd 
Sess., 142 CONG. REC. E1572 (No. 124, daily ed. Sept. 11, 1996) (introduced by Rep. 
Gibbons, would replace the income and social security taxes with a modified Value 
Added Tax/ Income Tax combination). Rep. Gephardt has proposed a 10% tax (but not 
a consumption tax), eliminating virtually all deductions, except mortgage interest. 
Recent studies of these proposals include: JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION 
AND ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS TO REPLACE THE FED. INCOME TAX, reprinted in 37 TAX 
ANALYSTS' DAILY TAX HIGHLIGHTS & DOCUMENTS 3587 (1995), and in 67 TAX NOTES 
1491 (1995) [hereinafter JCT REPORT]; AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS & 
MARTIN A. SULLIVAN, PH.D., FLATT AXES AND CONSUMPTION TAXES: A GUIDE TO THE 
DEBATE (1995) [hereinafter THE DEBATE]; TREASURY DEP'T OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW ARMEY-SHELBY FLAT TAX PROPOSAL, reprinted in 96 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 5-84, Jan. 8, 1996, available in Westlaw, TNT database, 96 TNT 5-84 
[hereinafter ARMEY-SHELBY]; KEMP COMM'N, REPORT OF THE NAT. COMM'N ON 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TAX REFORM (Jan. 17, 1996), reprinted in 96 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 12-46, Jan. 17, 1996, available in Westlaw, TNT database, 96 TNT 12-46. 
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redemptions and divorce; (2) the use of alimony trusts; and (3) 
nonqualified deferred compensation (so-called "rabbi") trusts. 
While many economists and tax lawyers say it will never happen, we 
may well be only a few years away from a fundamental change in our 
tax system. Political leaders are all quietly dancing around with it. 
Sadly, they don't seem to really understand what it is, and the general 
public is very much in the dark. 
Both the flat tax and USA tax proposals create a novel approach to 
moving from an income tax to a consumption tax. They fold consump-
tion tax concepts into both the taxation of business and individuals. The 
business side is a modified value-added tax (VAT), taxing all active 
business, but not investment profit. They would eliminate the present 
double tax on corporate profits, one of the long-standing criticisms of the 
current income tax, treating all businesses (including partnerships, 
limited liability companies, limited liability partnerships, S corporations, 
and self-employed persons) in the same manner. This would eliminate 
the artificially created tax differences among business entities, and would 
be a major reform of an area laden with unnecessary complexi-
ty-moving taxation of business to a higher plane of tax policy. 
The individual side of the proposals adopts a personal consumption 
tax, albeit by two different timing methods, where the emphasis is on tax 
incentives to save. The flat tax would include in an individual's gross 
income only cash wages, pension, and certain fringe benefits. Amounts 
invested would not be deducted from current income, and the income 
from these investments (dividends, interest, royalties, capital gains) 
would not be taxed on later receipt. The USA tax, by contrast, would 
include in gross income the items we currently include, and would allow 
a full deduction for the amounts invested or saved,3 resulting in a tax 
only on what is consumed. Some economists claim that the two 
approaches produce the same result, assuming the tax rates stay constant 
over the years. Stated another way, the theory is that allowing a full 
deduction for investments or savings in the year made (the USA tax) is 
the equivalent of allowing no deduction against income in the year the 
investment is made, but not taxing the income or gain therefrom when 
3. For discussion of the special (unfavorable) treatment of certain non-productive 
real estate, under both proposals, see Lester B. Snyder & Marianne Gallegos, Redefining 
the Role of the Federal Income Tax Law: Taking the Tax Law "Private" Through the 
Flat Tax and Other Consumption Taxes, 13 AM.J. TAX POL'Y 1, 23 (1996). 
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it is realized in subsequent years (the :flat tax). The USA tax method is 
sometimes referred to as a "cash-flow" type consumption tax, where 
savings are deducted from current income and taxed when consumed in 
a later tax period. The :flat tax adopts what is sometimes referred to as 
a "tax prepayment" method. But this applies only to wages, which are 
taxed in the year received, with any yield or return from that portion of 
wages invested or saved not taxed again when received in subsequent 
years.4 It is thus necessary to understand this so-called tax equivalency 
theory to understand the differences between the :flat tax and USA tax. 
A more detailed analysis of the tax equivalency issue is covered in Part 
II.C below. . 
The basic goal of these proposals is to create a tax base which 
includes only business income (which may, as in VAT countries, be 
passed on to the individual consumer), wages, and personal consump-
tion.5 In summary, the underlying rationale of these proposals appears 
to be the notion of taxing business profit only once by: (1) eliminating 
the potential double tax on corporate earnings, which under the current 
system, taxes profit and gains realized at the corporate level and taxes 
dividends received by shareholders at the individual level; (2) allowing 
businesses to fully expense capital purchases; and (3) eliminating the 
related double tax on an individual's savings. 
4. The two methods may be illustrated by an example based on the JOINT COMM. 
ON TAXATION, REPORT ON FLAT TAX PROPS. reprinted in 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 65-11, 
Apr. 4, 1995, available in Westlaw, TNT database, 95 TNT 65-11: 
The USA Tax Method: If T earns $25,000 and saves $1,000, which is 
deducted from his salary, then at a 20% tax rate he saves $200 in taxes in year 
one. If the amount saved earns 5% and he collects $1,050 in year two, his tax 
is on the full $1,050 at 20% or $210, leaving T with a net of $840. Under the 
USA Tax, ifT reinvests the $1,050 in another investment in year two, he can 
again postpone a tax on the $1,050 until a later period when he stops saving, 
or withdraws the investment and consumes it. The Flat Tax, "tax prepayment 
method" allows no deduction in year one for the $1,000 savings by T (in 
effect T prepays his tax on the amount saved), but excludes the yield or return 
on the $1,000. This leaves T with $800 to save. In year two, he has $840 
($800 x 5% = $40) with no tax on his investment return of $40, le;wing him 
with the same $840 as under the USA Tax. This assumes, however, that the 
same effective tax rate applies throughout the investment period. Since the 
Flat Tax statute provides for an annual inflation adjustment for the standard 
deduction, H.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 63(e), one can question the validity of 
the tax equivalency theory where the effective tax rate is likely to change 
annually. For other problems with the tax equivalency theory, particularly the 
treatment of losses, see Snyder & Gallegos, supra note 3, at 68-69 & n.271. 
5. The likely tax incidence of these proposals (i.e., who ultimately bears the tax, 
the consumer or capital investor),· is discussed in a recent study by MICHAEL J. 
McINTYRE & C. EUGENE STEUERLE, FEDERAL TAX REFORM, FAMILY PERSPECTIVE 20-
25 (1996) (prepared for the Finance Project, Washington, D.C. 20005). 
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There is no assurance that these proposals would increase our rate of 
savings. But they are clearly compatible with a more pervasive aim of 
"downsizing" the federal government · and returning (by Treasury 
estimates) over $130 billion each year in foregone tax revenue to the 
private investment sector.6 Such a transfer to the private sector would 
increase the amount of private savings. 
Much of what has been written to date on these proposals presumes 
Congress will be writing on a clean slate. However, many of the 
concepts referred to in the consumption tax bills borrow heavily from 
current income tax law. For example, the long-time troublesome 
distinctions between "earned income" (salaries and wages) and "invest-
ment income," between "trade or business" and "passive" investments, 
and between "ordinary" and "capital" gain are retained in the USA tax, 
but in a different format. The flat tax also sails between Scylla and 
Charybdis since it too amends the current Code and uses income tax 
terms, despite the aspersions cast on it.7 
The three limited test sites we have selected for evaluation historically 
have raised the type of broad-based policy issues and controversies that 
permeate the present system: Redemptions of corporate stock in a family 
business as part of a divorce raise conflicting tax results between the tax-
free interspousal transfer provision and the corporate stock redemption 
and dividend rules; alimony trusts raise issues of assignment or shifting 
of capital and its income in satisfaction of a spousal support divorce 
agreement; and "non-qualified" deferred compensation trusts (including 
so-called "rabbi trusts") raise the postponement of tax liability and 
related timing problems. All three topics involve double-tax, construc-
tive receipt, and drawing the line between "services" and "capital" 
issues. 
In assessing the pros and cons of the proposed changes in our tax 
structure, we will collaterally address four related questions: ( 1) How 
much simplification would be achieved?; (2) Have the proponents of 
these tax reforms, in their goal of encouraging savings and eliminating 
"double taxation" of business profits,8 paved the way for undertaxation 
of some recipients of these profits?; (3) To what extent do these 
6. ARMEY-SHELBY, supra note 2. 
7. Some material in this Article is taken from the senior author's article, co-
authored with Marianne Gallegos. See Snyder & Gallegos, supra note 3. 
8. For a discussion of the double tax issue, see id. at 14-15, 54-56, 61-68, 70-81. 
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"consumption" tax proposals require us to reassess our traditional 
"income" tax views on tax avoidance?; (4) Are there appropriate 
safeguards against abusive techniques in converting "consumption" into 
disguised "savings"?; and (5) To what extent would we be required to 
cast aside conventional tax planning and tax policy concepts in the new 
tax regime? 
Part II of the Article will address the stock redemption/divorce issues 
using the facts in the Ames case.9 Part III will discuss the use of trusts 
in two hypothetical cases: alimony and deferred compensation. 
II. DIVORCE AND REDEMPTION (OF STOCK, THAT IS) 
A. Fact Pattern 
John and Joann Ames owned and operated a McDonald's Corporation 
(McDonald's) franchise in the state of Washington, a community 
property state.10 The franchise was held by a corporation called Moriah 
Valley Enterprises, Inc. (Moriah). 11 The articles of incorporation 
included a right of first refusal on the part of the corporation to purchase 
the shares of any stockholder wishing to sell. The other shareholders 
had a right of second refusal. 12 
After several years of marriage and operating the franchise together, 
John and Joann separated and ultimately obtained a divorce. Pursuant 
to their divorce, McDonald's informed John and Joann of their policy 
concerning dissolution of marriages of owner-operators. Essentially, 
only one of them could end up owning the business. To accommodate 
McDonald's,13 Moriah redeemed Joann's shares in return for an 
installment note as part of the property settlement, with John as the 
note's guarantor. Joann reported and paid the tax to the IRS (Service) 
on the gain realized on the redemption of her shares in Moriah. She 
subsequently filed a refund suit in the U.S. District Court, claiming that 
the redemption of her stock should not be deemed a taxable sale of her 
stock back to the corporation under section 302(a) of the Code,14 but 
should instead be treated as a non-taxable transfer of her Moriah stock 
directly to John under another section of the Code, 15 which permits a 
tax-free interspousal transfer of property. She obtained a summary 
9. Ames v. Commissioner (John Ames), 102 T.C. 522 (1994). 
10. Id. at 523. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. And, presumably, John Ames, since he ended up as the sole stockholder. 
14. I.R.C. §§ 301, 302 (1996). 
15. I.R.C. § 1041 (1996). 
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judgment in her favor, with the court deciding that the transfer of stock 
to the corporation was really for the benefit of John. 16 The IRS also 
lost on appeal in the Ninth Circuit.17 
In a separate case in the Tax Court, the IRS then proposed to tax John 
as the recipient of a "constructive dividend" from the corporation on the 
theory that the corporation in effect paid his debt to Joann on his behalf. 
A divided Tax Court ruled against the IRS, however, holding that the 
redemption of Joann's stock by the corporation could not be deemed a 
dividend to John under case and IRS ruling precedents. 18 
B. Results Under Current Law 
Under the current Code, the fundamental issue in these two cases is 
which section of the Code prevails in a redemption of a shareholder's 
interest brought about incident to• a marital property settlement in a 
divorce. Because of this statutory conflict, and because the IRS failed 
to combine the two Arnes cases, Joann received $450,000 for her stock 
interest in Moriah without any tax to her or to John, who remained the 
sole shareholder of the corporation, and on whose behalf the corporate 
funds were paid. Transfers between spouses or former spouses are not 
taxed, with certain limitations for those transfers incident to divorce. 19 
The payee spouse pays a price for that nonrecognition treatment by 
taking a carryover basis on the transferred property,20 which effectively 
defers but does not forgive the tax due on any appreciation. 
By contrast, in the more general area of redemptions of a 
shareholder's interest by a corporation, section 302(b)(3) (and the safe 
harbor provisions of section 302( c )(2)21 that disable the constructive 
16. Ames v. United States (Joann Ames), 91-1 USTC ,r 50,207 (W.D. Wash. 
1991). 
17. Ames v. United States (Joann Ames), 981 F.2d 456,457 (9th Cir. 1992). 
18. Ames v. Commissioner (John Ames), 102 T.C. 522, 526 (1994). 
19. I.R.C. § 104l{a). Transfers between former spouses that are incident to their 
divorce may be accomplished up to a year after the end of the marriage, id. § 1041 ( c )(l ), 
or is related to the cessation of the marriage, id. § 1041(c)(2). The regulations spell out 
a rebuttable presumption that such a transfer must occur within six years of the end of 
the marriage. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-lT(b) (1984). 
20. I.R.C. § 104l{b). 
21. Id. § 302(c)(2). 
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ownership rules contained in section 318)22 govern redemptions of a 
family member's interest. 
Thus, if a family member completely redeems her interest in a close 
corporation where the remaining shareholder is another family member, 
then, even though the remaining shareholder(s) may be related within the 
meaning of section 318(a),23 the redeeming shareholder normally is 
taxable on her gain, albeit at the lower capital gain rate.24 The "sale" 
of her stock is not treated as a dividend to the redeeming shareholder in 
this context.25 As for the non-redeeming ( or continuing) shareholder 
(John, in our case), the Tax Court noted the "well established" test that 
the non-redeeming shareholder normally "realizes no gain or loss or 
dividend income solely because all or a portion of the stock of another 
shareholder was redeemed, even though the effect of the redemption is 
to increase his percentage ownership in the corporation."26 The 
application of these rules assumes that the standard redemption does not 
confer a sufficient benefit to the remaining family member/shareholder. 
But there is a potential trap for the ill-advised under the current tax law. 
When "the remaining shareholder blundered into incurring a direct and 
primary obligation to purchase the stock, which he belatedly attempts to 
shift to the corporation,"27 the cases are far less clear.28 However, the 
Service seemingly ended the controversy by issuing Revenue Ruling 69-
608, setting forth examples illustrating when a nonredeeming 
shareholder's promise to purchase the redeemer's stock was "primary 
22. Id. § 318(a). 
23. Id. Parents, spouses, children, and grandchildren, not to mention related 
entities such as partnerships, trusts and other corporations can have their shares attributed 
to the redeeming shareholder under§ 318(a), often with the consequence of changing 
the characterization of the corporate distribution. 
24. The current maximum rate on long term capital gains, for individuals, is 28%. 
I.R.C. § l(h) (1996). 
25. Id. § 301(c). Distributions defined as dividends (which are made from the 
corporation's earnings and profits under § 316) are treated as ordinary income. The 
remaining amount in excess of basis is given capital gains treatment. Id. § 301(c)(3)(A). 
26. Ames v. Commisioner (John Ames), 102 T.C. 522, 534 (1994) (citing Wall 
v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir.1947), and Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 
865 (3d Cir., 1958)); see also Edler v. Commissioner, 727 F.2d 857 (9th Cir., 1984), 
ajf'g 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 508 (1982). 
27. Arnes (John), 102 T.C. at 535-536. 
28. Alan L. Feld, Divorce and Redemption, 64 TAX NOTES 651, 652 (1994). 
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and unconditional."29 In other words, whose obligation is it-the 
corporation's or the remaining shareholder's? 
Thus, the key technical question, as Alan Feld reminds us, as to which 
of these two mechanisms (section 302 redemptions, or section 1041 
transfers between spouses) should govern a redemption of a spouse's 
interest in the family corporation that is incident to her divorce from the 
remaining shareholder, centers on whether the latter, in this case John 
Ames, had an unconditional obligation to redeem Joann's stock based 
upon the deferral of division of the marital assets under section 1041.30 
IRS temporary regulations also allow section 1041 to govern transactions 
between Joann and Moriah on John's behalf by providing coverage of 
transactions involving third parties.31 In the Arnes case, the critical 
question was whether or not Joann's redemption of her shares was "on 
behalf of' John, making the redemption of Joann's shares a "primary 
and unconditional obligation" of John's,32 or whether it was a transac-
tion between Joann and the corporation where John was not a primary 
party. The Ninth Circuit and Tax Court came out on opposite sides of 
the issue. The entire experience, which to date has not been further 
pursued by any of the parties, indicates the complexity of the current 
system and the importance of observing certain forms in order to achieve 
certain tax results. 
In contrast to the contradictory results that the Ninth Circuit and the 
Tax Court reached in the Ames cases, another recent Tax Court case, 
Hayes v. Commissioner,33 illustrates a situation where the husband 
clearly did incur a primary obligation and thus liability for a constructive 
dividend. In Hayes, the divorce decree initially ordered the husband to 
pay his wife for her interest in the family corporation. A later nunc pro 
29. Rev. Ru!. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 42; see also Feld, supra note 28, at 652. "The 
Service said it would continue to assert constructive dividend treatment against [the 
remaining shareholder] if his obligation to acquire the stock from the [redeeming 
shareholder] was primary and unconditional. However, when [the remaining 
shareholder] was only secondarily liable" there would be no constructive dividend 
treatment. Id. 
30. Feld, supra note 28, at 652. 
31. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-lT(c) (1984). This temporary regulation, which 
takes the form of questions and answers, asks in Q-9 "[m]ay transfers of property to 
third parties on behalf of a spouse (or former spouse) qualify under section 1041 ?" Id. 
(Emphasis added). The answer is yes, "provided all other requirements of the section 
are satisfied." Id. 
32. Rev. Ru!. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 43. 
33. 101 T.C. 593 (1993). 
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tune order modified the decree ordering the corporation to discharge the 
note. This follows another case, Sullivan v. United States,34 where the 
Eighth Circuit held that if a buyer who is under a primary obligation to 
buy the shares from a second party has the corporation redeem them 
instead, he will be deemed as having received a constructive dividend by 
this discharge of his obligation.35 The situation in Sullivan was so clear 
that Rev. Rul. 69-608, mentioned above as seemingly ending litigation 
over primary obligations, uses it as "situation 1" in describing how a 
primary obligation will result in a constructive dividend.36 
1. Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court finding that Joann's 
redemption fell under the aegis of section 1041. 37 The court based its 
decision on the trial court having found that Joann's redemption was 
made "on behalf of' John because he had a "primary and unconditional" 
obligation to Joann, which the transfer relieved him of.38 The court 
found that John's obligation to Joann was based upon the divorce 
property settlement and that Joann's right to sue John did not involve the 
corporation.39 In the Ninth Circuit's eyes, then, John fell afoul of Rev. 
Rul. 69-608, and (though not a party in that case) should incur the tax 
liability as a constructive dividend when Moriah redeemed Joann's 
shares.40 Joann was entitled to her refund.41 This analysis pointed to 
the ascendancy of section 1041 over section 302 in areas where they 
clashed, which the Ninth Circuit justified by pointing to legislative 
history behind section 1041 as intending the section to "defer the tax 
consequences of transfers between spouses or former spouses."42 
2. Tax Court 
The Tax Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis, relying instead 
upon the Service's previous pronouncements describing an agreement 
34. 363 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 905 (1967). 
35. BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ,r 9.06[6], at 9-45 (6th ed. 1994 & Supp. 1995). 
36. Rev. Ru!. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 42; see also Thomas Monaghan, Corporate 
Redemption in the Context of Marital Dissolutions: I.R.C. § 1041 and Ames v. United 
States, 68 WASH. L. REV. 923,931 (1993). 
37. Ames v. United States (Joann Ames), 981 F.2d 456, 457 (9th Cir. 1992). 
38. Id. at 458-59. 
39. Id. at 459. 
40. Id. (citing Schroeder v. Commissioner, 831 F.2d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
41. Id. at 460. 
42. Id. at 458 (citing H. R. REP. No. 98-432, pt. 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1491, 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1134). 
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between two shareholders that the corporntion would redeem the stock 
of either in the event . of his or her death.43 The court held that the 
marital property settlement, like the shareholder agreement, did not 
create a primary and unconditional obligation on John's part,44 thus 
upholding the redemption treatment that John and Joann originally 
envisioned in their property settlement negotiations, in which Joann was 
to bear the tax burden as capital gain upon recognition of cash received 
under the terms of the note. 
3. Assessing the Argument 
The net effect of the two cases was a "whipsaw result ... of [the 
Service's] own making."45 The Service got caught between two 
interpretations of which section of the Code should govern in the area 
of closely held, family corporations incident to divorce. In his 
concurring opinion, Judge Beghe pointed to the legislative purpose 
behind section 302, which was "to bear lightly on withdrawals from 
incorporated partnerships,"46 and the reliance that John, Joann, and their 
counsel placed upon this background to the bright line rules of section 
302.47 This section governs how to characterize income as either 
ordinary or capital gain. 
43. Ames v. Commissioner (John Ames), 102 T.C. 522, 528 (1994) (citing Rev. 
Ru!. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 42, 44). The Tax Court directly used sitµation 5 to support 
its position: 
A and B owned all of the outstanding stock of X corporation. An agreement 
between A and B provided that upon the death of either, X will redeem all of 
the X stock owned by the decedent at the time of his death. In the event that 
X does not redeem the shares from the estate, the agreement provided that the 
surviving shareholder would purchase the unredeemed shares from the 
decedent's estate. B died and, in accordance with the agreement, X redeemed 
all of the shares owned by his estate. 
In this case A was only secondarily liable under the agreement between A 
and B. Since A was not primarily obligated to purchase the X stock from the 
estate of B, he received no constructive distribution when X redeemed the 
stock. 
Id. (citing Rev. Ru!. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 43.) 
44. Id. at 530 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.3-416(1) (West 1979)). 
45. Id. at 541-42 (Beghe, J., concurring). 
46. Id. at 540 (quoting Marvin A. Chirelstein, Optional Redemptions and Optional 
Dividends: Taxing the Repurchase of Common Shares, 78 YALE L.J. 739, 749 (1969)). 
47. Id. 
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With section 1041, Congress sought to use bright line rules to define 
who shall bear the tax burden in transfers between spouses and thus 
decrease the litigation and uncertainty that "relentlessly whipsawed" the 
government in the wake of the landmark case of United States v. 
Davis.48 In that case, the' husband transferred some appreciated stock 
to his wife pursuant to a property settlement agreement. The Court held 
that this transfer was not a gift and that he had realized a taxable 
gain.49 The worst part of this outcome was that "it frequently imposed 
a heavy tax burden at the worst possible time-when a couple's finances 
were in disarray and every available dollar was needed to finance the 
transition from one household into two."50 Section 1041 relieves the 
spouses of the burden of paying taxes for a recognition event that often 
generates little or no cash. Congress specifically designed section 1041 
"[t]o correct these problems, and make the tax laws as unintrusive as 
possible with respect to relations between spouses."51 
This purpose is entirely congruent with section 302 in the sense that 
both seek to minimize the tax burden in the changing of close, often 
family, relationships making the transition easier, and indeed, even 
possible. For instance, section 302 has specific rules to allow for 
generational changes in ownership of family held businesses at the lower 
capital gain rate. That is precisely the point behind section 302( c )(2), 
which de-triggers the family stock attribution rules where the redeeming 
shareholder severs her entire interest in the corporation. Section 1041 
accomplishes a similar goal by deferring recognition of gain in a marital 
context, shifting any future gain, nonetheless, to the spouse remaining as 
the sole shareholder of the corporation. Both sections recognize that the 
taxpayers need cash to pay their taxes. Very often, these transactions 
produce very little cash. Therefore, it is preferable to defer recognition 
until such time that cash is realized. The best way to achieve that goal, 
as well as maximize certainty of treatment for the divorcing couple, as 
Judge Beghe said in his concurring opinion, is to observe the bright line 
rules of Rev. Rul. 69-608, which will both minimize the tax burden52 
and place it on the spouse who has the cash.53 
48. 370 U.S. 65 (1962). 
49. Id. at 66-7; see also MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
85 (7th ed. 1994). 
50. Michael Asimow, The Assault on Tax-Free Divorce: Carryover Basis and 
Assignment of Income, 44 TAX L. REV. 65, 67 (1988). 
51. Id. at 69 (citing H. R. REP. No. 98-432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1491 (1984)). 
52. Ames v. Commissioner (John Ames), 102 T.C. 522, 541 (1994). 
53. While approximately $290,000 of the consideration was actually in the form 
of a corporate note (carrying 9% interest), no issue was raised in these cases as to the 
potential applicability of the installment method of reporting any gain under I.R.C. 
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Yet, this position appears to have something of a "form over 
substance" flavor. The taxpayers have to be technically careful to ensure 
that any agreements to buy out one shareholder do not create this 
primary and unconditional obligation on the remaining shareholder. 
Insensitivity of the parties to the nuances of Rev. Rul. 69-608, such as 
when their divorce agreement requires one spouse to purchase the other's 
stock, which is later modified by a court order allowing the corporation 
to pay the note after the "purchasing" spouse had already agreed to 
assume. primary obligation on it, will subject the purchasing spouse, as 
the remaining shareholder, to a constructive dividend. This unhappy 
consequence befell the unfortunate husband in Hayes v. Commission-
er.54 Tax reform. proponents could point to this seeming anomaly as 
§ 453. If the transaction was deemed a stock redemption under § 302, then Joann's 
realized capital gain would be the difference between the fair market value of the note 
and her basis in the stock. If the transaction was a tax-free interspousal transfer under 
§ 1041, then no gain would attach to the note received, thus eliminating the relevance 
of § 453. Interest on the note, however, should be taxable to Joann. The chief 
disadvantage of the installment method, where it is relevant, is that the size of the 
obligation, which is in excess of $150,000, could run afoul of the interest charge rules 
of§ 453A(b)(l). But, this section imposes interest only if the aggregate face value of 
all such obligations exceeds $5 million, only a remote possibility for this transaction. 
I.R.C. § 453A(b)(2)(B); see also BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ,r 41.3[3] (2d. ed. 1995). However, if 
Joann were to sell or otherwise dispose of the note before the expiration of the ten-year 
expiration date, the general rule of I.R.C. § 453B(a) provides for an acceleration of any 
unreported gain, by subtracting the "basis" of the note from the amount realized. But 
it would be inconsistent with the non-recognition of gain structure under§ 1041 to tax 
the transferor spouse (Joann) on any later disposition of the note. Section 453B(b) could 
be argued to resolve this problem by defining the "basis of the obligation" as "amount 
equal to the income which would be returnable were the obligation satisfied in full. " 
I.R.C. § 453B(b) (emphasis added). Since no income, other than interest, should be 
taxed, perhaps the realized, but non-recognized gain, should be deemed part of her basis. 
The reference to§ 1041 transfers in§ 453B(g) seems to refer only to the case where the 
property transferred to a spouse under § 1041 is itself a pre-existing installment note, 
which is not our case. 
54. 101 T.C. 593 (1993); see also supra text accompanying notes 21-29; BITTKER 
& EUSTICE, supra note 35, ,r 9.06[6], at 9-46 n. 216; Feld, supra note 28, at 654. 
The underlying principle was memorialized by the Supreme Court in Old Colony Trust 
Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929), where the corporation attempted to pay the 
income tax obligations of its president above and beyond the nearly $1 million 
compensation paid directly to him. The Court held that the corporation's payment of tax 
was income imputed to him. 
This theory of imputing income to a shareholder by assessing a constructive dividend 
is codified in a different context in I.R.C. § 7872, where foregone interest on loans 
between related persons (including corporations and their shareholders) is imputed and 
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a prime example of the current system's arbitrary nature. It does not 
treat substantively similar transactions in a similar way, violating a basic 
premise of tax equality. But, in Rev. Rul. 69-608, "form" is the 
"substance."55 Lines have to be drawn and definitions made in order 
to administer the system. Indeed, this issue goes to the very heart of any 
discussion of tax reform. It arises in both of ·the consumption tax 
systems under examination in this Article.56 
To illustrate the importance of achieving the correct form, consider the 
couple above who, unlike the Ameses, arrange for one spouse to buy the 
other out directly. While the transaction appears to be equivalent to 
Arnes, it differs in that, contractually, they have distributed the tax 
burden differently. If John, for instance, were to have bought Joann's 
stock directly for a note payable to her, section 1041 would defer any 
tax on him until he sold that stock.57 However, John would not only 
be using his own after-tax dollars (instead of corporate pre-tax dollars), 
but his stock basis would not reflect the amount he actually paid for the 
stock. Instead, under section 1041(b), John would be required to carry 
over Joann's lower stock basis, similar to a donee of a gift.58 Joann 
would escape tax entirely, since she received cash or a note.59 This 
would, theoretically, reduce the amount he would be willing to pay her 
to the amount she would have realized, after tax, had the corporation 
redeemed her stock (by issuing a note similar to John's) in a taxable 
non-spousal transfer, outside of section 1041. The inequality of 
bargaining power between the two spouses in particular cases, however, 
makes the section 1041 result less laudable than has been assumed by 
those who embrace that section's rationale.60 
then treated as a constructive dividend. Another example, and even more directly on 
point in this case, is found in the regulations: "The cancellation of indebtedness of a 
shareholder by a corporation shall be treated as a distribution of property." Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.301-l(m) (as amended in 1995); see also, BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 35, ,i 
8.05[6], at 8-46. 
55. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 35, 'l! 9.06[6], at 9-45 n.214. 
56. Snyder & Gallegos, supra note 3, at 69. 
57. I.R.C. § 104l(b)(l) (1996). 
58. Id. § 1015. 
59. Joann could be liable for a deferred tax, as in John's case, had she received 
some of John's low basis property in addition to the cash or note, and later sold that 
property. Id. § 1041(b)(2). A potential for a double tax exists if the corporation is 
deemed to have been the real purchaser of her stock where the consideration consists of 
appreciated corporate assets. Section 31 l(b), as part of the 1986 Congressional repeal 
of most of the General Utilities doctrine, now taxes the corporation on the built-in gain 
on the appreciated property distributed in redemption of stock. This coupled with either 
a capital gain or dividend to the distributee-shareholder results in double taxation. 
60. See, e.g., Asimow, supra note 50, at 73-84. 
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A court order for John to pay Joann would have the same effect as a 
direct stock purchase by John: a primary and unconditional obligation. 
However, if a court were to order the corporation to redeem Joann's 
stock, Rev. Rul. 69-608, at least as interpreted by the majority of the 
Tax Court, seems to assure that John would not receive constructive 
dividend treatment, even though John's benefit arguably exceeds that of 
the corporation--all because the corporation .has the court ordered 
obligation--and not John.61 
Up to this point, analysis has focused only on the individual and how 
interactions with a close corporation can produce--or not pro-
duce-taxable events and their ultimate characterization as either 
ordinary income or capital gains. In the sections that follow, the same 
issues will be highlighted in the context of how the various consumption 
tax proposals will treat them. These sections will also focus, to a certain 
extent, on the corporation and how certain events can shift or defer the 
corporate tax burden in ways that are quite alien to the current system, 
but presumably consistent with the fiat tax and USA tax proposals. 
C. Results Under the Flat Tax, HR. 2060 
1. Simplification 
The entire controversy that arose in the Arnes cases over who should 
bear the tax burden, and for what reason, would seem to vanish under 
the fiat tax. When John and Joann divorced, John caused Moriah to 
redeem Joann's stock in return for a note. The note, as a redemption of 
corporate interest, would seemingly make the section 302/section 1041 
controversy moot. Because the gain on the investment has theoretically 
been taxed at the corporate level, it does not get taxed again upon 
distribution to the investor. The fiat tax avoids double taxation by only 
61. Feld, supra note 28, at 652. Feld writes that the effect is to give practitioners 
a "clear line" with which to plan. Id. at 653; see also Asimow, supra note 50, at 73-84. 
Asimow refutes the charge that carryover basis, which is consistent with § 1041 (b)' s gift 
treatment of inter-spousal transfers, somehow is biased against the nonworking spouse. 
He shows the importance of negotiating the property settlements to account for the tax 
burden that will eventually come due. But, the disparity of bargaining power between 
the spouses may, in some cases, minimize the advantages of negotiation for one of the 
spouses. 
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taxing wages at the individual level. The distribution, since it is not a 
wage, falls outside the tax base.62 
Changing the form of the transaction to that of John paying Joann 
directly with an equivalent note--essentially the Hayes case-effectively 
shifted the tax burden from the wife to the husband as a constructive 
dividend under the current Code even though the· corporation actually 
paid the note. Under the flat tax, the outcome is exactly the same as 
having Moriah redeem Joann's interest: Both transactions fall outside 
the tax base.63 The involved controversies described in the previous 
section simply become irrelevant. That irrelevance ensures that both 
transactions, similar substantively, are tre_ated similarly by the tax 
system. The flat tax also protects taxpayers, like the unfortunate 
husband in Hayes, from double taxation, once at the corporate level and 
then a second time at the individual level.· The only price paid is a 
drastic narrowing of the tax base, just as Hall and Rabushka envisioned 
when they first proposed the flat tax in the 1980s. 64 However, this 
simplification raises another issue: What is a wage? 
2. · Wages Versus Investment Income 
This issue is definitional, just as it is under the current law. However, 
the fault line runs not between ordinary income and capital gain as in the 
current system, but between wages and investment income because the 
former is taxed to the individual and the latter is not.65 But, an 
argument can be made that a component of Joann's stock redemption 
can be structured as deferred--and disguised--wages on which neither 
she nor the corporation may pay tax. Even if the corporation were to 
pay a tax, it represents a major shifting of the incidence and timing of 
the tax. 
62. H.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 63(a). 
63. We are assuming, throughout this article, that the corporation is not distributing 
appreciated property (a so-called "in-kind" distribution) to the shareholder in redemption 
of her stock. A distribution of appreciated property, without a tax at the corporate level, 
would eliminate all taxation of business profit at both the business and individual levels, 
even after the business had fully expensed the purchase of this type of property. (Under 
the USA tax, however, the shareholder would include the fair market value of the 
property received in her income, with a deduction for certain reinvestments of this 
property.) While the flat tax does not, as currently drafted, address the problem of 
corporate distributions of "in-kind" property, presumably it would follow the USA tax 
provision(§ 211) which adopts current law by treating the distribution as a taxable sale 
of the property at its fair market value. 
64. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995). 
65. H.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 63. 
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Varying the Arnes scenario will illustrate this issue in a fairly stark 
manner. Suppose that the Ames, when they formed Moriah,66 only 
paid themselves a relatively small wage, say $50,000 per annum each as 
owner-operators, for their services. If they had to pay two executives 
$100,000 per annum to operate Moriah so that they could do something 
else, they would have paid $200,000 in total compensation, instead of 
just $100,000 in any given year. The flat tax would tax wages paid for 
services rendered during the tax year.67 But since the proposed flat tax 
rate of seventeen percent is the same at both business and individual 
levels, aside from payroll taxes, the same total tax would be paid 
whether or not the owners receive salary or dividends.68 For example, 
if the business paid only $100,000 in compensation instead of the 
$200,000 wages that would have been paid in an arms length employ-
ment relationship, the $100,000 lower business level deduction for wages 
would increase the business tax by $17,000. However, if the lower 
salary were distributed instead to the owners as a dividend (not taxable 
under the flat tax), the owners would have $17,000 less tax to pay. 
Thus, either way the owner-operator chooses to withdraw profits from 
her business, the same total tax is paid.69 
However, the flat tax biases their investment decision by encouraging 
John and Joann to leave their profits in the corporation. A major new 
incentive allows businesses a full write-off in the year of purchase of 
"property used in business,"70 such as equipment and other assets 
bought for expansion. These business level deductions thus reduce its 
tax by seventeen percent of the amount of business purchases. On the 
other hand, since owners such as John and Joann are not given a 
deduction for their individual financial investments under the flat tax,71 
66. Our discussion assumes all transaction take place after the effective operative 
date of these tax proposals, disregarding, for this purpose, any special basis adjustment 
and other transition rules that might be in force.· 
67. R.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 63. 
68. In fact, any distribution to the owners, even in redemption of their stock, would 
be non-taxable to the business and to the owners. 
69. There is a built-in assumption in this example (and in the flat tax proposal, 
itself) that the IRS would not try to recharacterize the dividend as a constructive wage 
for payroll or other tax purposes. However, the proponents of this tax reform have 
expressly disavowed any attempt to coordinate the flat tax with our current payroll tax 
system. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 64, at 77. 
70. R.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 1 l(d)(2)(A)(i). 
71. Cf the unlimited savings deduction under the USA tax, discussed below. 
1501 
an investment of wages received from the business starts at an after-tax 
amount which is seventeen percent smaller. In other words, an individual 
level financial investment must outperform business asset purchases to 
a considerable degree, although the margin of difference will become 
less the longer the holding period for the two types of assets.72 
Deferring the corporate tax (bya full 100 percent deduction for business 
assets. purchased) will thus produce a higher yield on those types of 
investments made through the corporation.73 
3. Business Expenses and Borrowing 
Next, let us assume that at the time of the divorce, the business had 
a large operating loss carryforward (generated by fully deducted business 
asset purchases which exceeded the gross income of the business). The 
loss carryforward could be large enough to ensure that, although 
profitable from a cash flow standpoint, the corporation was paying little 
or no tax. As discussed above, both the flat tax and the USA tax allow 
for immediate expensing of all business asset purchases, regardless of 
whether or not they are capitalized or currently deductible under present 
law. To use current tax jargon, one way to regard this full expensing 
mechanism is that it postpones recognition of any gain. In this context, 
there is no real matching of revenues and expenses to a particular period. 
It allows deferral of any payment of tax until some later period. This 
forms the very heart of the bias for keeping business profits in corporate 
solution. 
Moreover, borrowing by the business, as others have recognized, can 
potentially provide even more of a deferral-to the point of allowing 
withdrawal of dividends/profits in a period earlier than that in which the 
business tax would otherwise come due. Some observers have argued 
that not taxing borrowed money when first received by the borrower is 
the economic equivalent of denying a deduction for the repayment of the 
72. While businesses are not taxed on investment income (such as interest, 
dividends and capital gains), in keeping with the value-added tax philosophy, they are 
also not allowed a deduction for financial assets, including stock in other corporations. 
Business operating losses are carried forward, however, under rules similar to current net 
operating loss rules, but with the addition of an interest refund component. H.R. 2060, 
supra note 1, §§ ll(d)(2)(A)(i), dll(g). The USA tax has similar provisions. S. 722, 
supra note 2, §§ 203, 205(a)(3)C), 212, 207. 
73. One example of this point: If John and Joann were to leave $100 with the 
business which buys an asset with a 5% rate of return (exclusive of the tax effect), then 
in five years, the business should be worth $127.63 more than without the business 
investment. A financial asset purchased by John and Joann, with after-tax wage dollars 
· ($83), to achieve the same result, must produce a return of 8.99% return ($127.63) on 
the original investment. 
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interest and principal on the theory that the value of the loan at its 
inception equals the present discounted value of the future interest and 
principal payments.74 However, when a business uses those loan 
proceeds to purchase business assets, which are fully deducted in the 
year of purchase, it is likely to generate loss carryforwards ( excess of 
deductions over current income) that defer taxes for several tax years. 
This carryover of excess deductions against future years' income also 
yields the equivalent of an additional deduction computed by using the 
interest refund component.75 The use of tax-free borrowed money in 
this fashion adds up to much more than the "net present value" of the 
cash stream of loan repayments. 76 
4. The Divorce andBeyond: New Tax Planning Opportunities 
If John and Joann decide to, end their marriage and redeem her share 
of the corporate ownership utilizing the above-described process of 
having the, corporation apply her foregone salary to fully deductible 
business asset investments, thus generating loss carryforwards, both the 
corporation and Joann are accorded substantial tax benefits. Joann 
receives a note from the corporation; secured by John, just as in the 
Arnes case, payable over a ten year period.77 Under the flat tax, she 
would not be taxable on any of it because it is nominally a return on her 
investment. But, as can be seen from our previous discussion, part of 
her investment might be more properly deemed deferred compensation 
that was reinvested in the corporation. 
For the purposes of our scenario, we can quantify the size of each 
yearly investment as the difference between the wages Joann was paid 
and the wages that would have been paid in an arms-length employment 
relationship-$50,000 per annum for the period of time she and John 
operated the business together, say ten years.78 Thus, $500,000 
($50,000 foregone salary x ten years) of Joann's note received for selling 
74. THE DEBATE, supra note 2, at 188. 
75. See supra note 72. 
76. See Appendix at end of this Article (for a sample illustration of the effect of 
borrowing to purchase business assets and the resulting tax deferral benefits). 
77. Although the form of the transaction has no tax significance under the flat tax, 
both John and Joann escape individual taxes regardless of whether John or the 
corporation bears the primary and unconditional obligation on the note. 
78. This assumes a return in corporate growth in earnings of 10%, which is much 
less than the previous examples. 
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her stock back to the corporation is presumably transformed, under the 
flat tax, into a form. of "savings." Joann is not taxed on this "principal" 
of her note nor the interest earned on it, since they are not "wages." 
The corporation is also likely to escape, or greatly minimize, the 
business tax if John keeps investing on behalf of the corporation during 
this period, making judicious use of borrowing and any loss 
carryforwards on its business asset investments (for example, expansion 
of its operations). The planning would become more complex ifwe take 
into account John's future tax burdens, resurrecting the current concepts 
of time value of money and net present value. Through the use of 
proper planning, John can defer a good deal of tax, thus reducing his 
burden as well. 
If John were to sell out eventually, in years to come, he also would 
not pay any tax. However, the corporation will have to pay taxes on its 
profits during those years in which its expenses did not exceed revenues. 
Because of the nature of the expensing, a corporation's tax burden rnay 
vary quite significantly, depending upon what capital investments have 
been made and when--all of which lend to a considerable amount of tax 
planning. 
If John were to perform a "sale and seller redernption,"79 the buyer 
could purchase the business for very little cash out if John were willing 
to take a note. In another alternative, the corporation could also borrow 
the funds necessary to redeem. John out of the business. John would not 
be taxed on the amount received since it was not wages. Assuming that 
Moriah could borrow that much, John would be better off since he 
would not face the risk of Moriah's continued viability under new 
ownership. Moreover, he could also borrow funds him.self and then 
assign the note to the corporation in return for his stock. He could also 
just assign the note to the corporation and have it pay it off. Under the 
flat tax, all of these are exactly the same-transactions that fall outside 
the tax base. By tax planning as described above, John could defer any 
tax that would come due on the corporation's part for a significant 
number of years. The amount for which he could sell the corporation 
would be decreased by the net present value of the expected tax burden. 
This would, in fact, shift John's tax burden to the business's new owner. 
79. So named in BITIKER & EUSTICE, supra note 35, ,i 9.06[2], from a two-step 
transaction where the stockholder first sold a portion of his stock to the buyer and then 
had the corporation redeem the remainder under I.R.C. § 302(b)(3). The Service 
attempted to recharacterize this using the step transaction doctrine so as to obtain 
dividend treatment of the redemption, when the redemption preceded the sale but 
ultimately failed. See Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914, 917 (1954); see also, BITIKER 
& EUSTICE, supra note 35, ,i 9.06[2], at 9-39 to 9-40. 
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Perhaps the best way that the two parties could value the potential tax 
burden would be by using the tax value of the expense carryforwards at 
the point of sale. This would represent the amount of deferral that the 
buyer would inherit from John's investment activities. 
Compare any of these alternatives to the tax burden that John and 
Joann would have borne had they been paid a salary-taxable at 
seventeen percent in the year in which it was received. In Joann's case, 
she would have received substantially less than if she had left the wealth 
in corporate solution and, in effect, reinvested in the business. John, in 
later years, would face much the same choice: take it now and pay 
seventeen percent, or leave it in corporate solution until the point of sale. 
D. Results Under The USA Tax, S. 722 
1. Simplification 
It has been observed that "[t]he Nunn-Domenici [USA tax] proposal 
is not as simple as the flat tax, nor is it as sweeping in its elimination of 
tax preferences."80 The American Institute of Certified Public Accoun-
tants attributes this to "realistic accommodations that may be necessary 
to ensure sufficient political support for enactment."81 But, the USA 
tax's treatment of income and discharge of indebtedness raise some 
complications and revive the "form over substance" debate. 82 The 
"form over substance" debate also vitiates the notion that the flat tax and 
cash flow, or classic type consumption taxes, are equivalent. The 
decisions made about how to structure a particular transaction may 
change the tax treatment quite radically, thus influencing the decision-
making process when structuring that transaction. 83 The influence of 
a tax system's design on such decision-making and differing outcomes 
between the flat and cash flow taxes also manifests itself in other ways. 
80. THE DEBATE, supra note 2, at 124. 
81. Id. 
82. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text. 
83. Id. 
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2. The Definitional Problem in the USA Tax and the 
Fallacy of Tax Equivalency 
To return to the scenario discussed in the flat tax section, let us 
assume that John and Joann are married, owner-operators of Moriah, 
running a McDonald's as their primary business. If they paid them-
selves $50,000 each when the value of the services they render to 
Moriah would be $100,000 each in an arms-length employment 
relationship, they would be taxed in each year on the $50,000 with a 
deduction for whatever they saved and did not consume. 84 If they paid 
themselves $100,000 a year and then saved $50,000 in investments other 
than Moriah, then they would only be taxed on the $50,000 each that 
they consumed. 85 The remaining $50,000 would not be taxed as long 
as it remained invested. The definitional fault line that appears between 
different types of income in the current system ( ordinary versus capital 
gain income) and the flat tax ( wages versus investment income) recedes 
in the conventional consumption system, since it taxes only that wealth 
which is consumed.86 
Conventional analysis assumes tax equivalency between the flat tax 
and the cash flow type consumption tax embodied in the USA tax.87 
As described in the Introduction of this Article,88 the theory of tax 
equivalency is that allowing a full deduction for investments or savings 
in the year made (the USA tax) is the equivalent of allowing no 
deduction against income in the year the investment is made, but not 
taxing the income or gain therefrom when it is realized in subsequent 
years (the flat tax). The flat tax adopts what is sometimes referred to as 
a "tax prepayment" method. But this applies only to wages, which are 
taxed in the year received, with any yield or return from the portion of 
wages invested or saved not taxed again when received in subsequent 
84. S. 722, supra note 2, § 201. 
85. Id. 
86. For a complete theoretical discussion of a consumption tax, see William 
Andrews' seminal piece that appeared in the Harvard Law Review over twenty years 
ago. William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 
87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974). Andrews describes the consumption system as "a cash 
flow income tax [which] would correspond very closely to another ideal, that of a tax 
whose burdens are apportioned to current personal consumption expenditures rather than 
to total accretion." Id. at 1116. 
In this issue, Alan Schenk describes the current rationales for adopting a consumption 
tax/VAT business tax. See Alan Schenk, The Plethora of Consumption Tax Proposals: 
Putting the Value Added Tax, Flat Tax, Retail Sales Tax, and USA Tax into Perspective, 
33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1281 (1997). 
87. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 64; see also JCT REPORT, supra note 2. 
88. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. 
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years. The equivalency theory is only valid if the same effective tax rate 
applies throughout the investment period.89 For instance, if rates rose 
over time, then the "tax prepayment method" (the flat tax) would both 
effectively tax at a lower rate than the "cash flow method" (the USA 
tax) and be less effective at raising actual tax receipts in the future.90 
It would also change behaviors by either subsidizing saving, if rates 
decreased over time, or subsidizing future consumption. 
On the surface, the effect of the business taxes in the flat tax and the 
USA tax appear to be quite similar. Assuming that Moriah has the same 
expenses under the USA tax as under the flat tax scenario, where it pays 
little or no business tax, John and Joann would receive roughly 
equivalent treatment during the period prior to getting divorced.91 This 
assumes, however, that the business expenses are high enough that the 
lack of salary deduction under the USA tax does not change the result. 
Under the flat tax, wages are deductible on the theory that they will be 
taxed in the same period on the individual side. Under the USA tax, 
wages and salary are not deductible beyond the payroll tax credit.92 
Thus, even at tax equivalent rates, John and Joann would pay a much 
89. The flat tax statute provides for an annual inflation adjustment for the standard 
deduction, thereby automatically changing the effective tax rate annually. H.R. 2060, 
supra note 1, § 63(e). Tax rates, historically, have changed quite frequently, and there 
is no reason to believe that this would not occur under the proposals discussed. 
90. This is because the wages in the tax base in period one are taxed at, say, 17%, 
and the investment income in subsequent periods, when the tax rates are higher, are 
outside the tax base, regardless of whether it is consumed or rolled over into savings. 
91. This assumes equivalent tax rates for both regimes on both individuals and 
businesses. However, the USA tax has a lower tax rate on businesses (11 %) and an 
eventual graduated tax rate on individuals from 8% to 40%. S. 722, supra note 2, § 13. 
92. The USA tax provides for a 7.65% payroll tax credit to both businesses and 
individual taxpayers. (Payroll taxes refer to the 6.2% OASDI tax on both employer and 
employee-up to the taxable wage base, which is $62,700 for 1996----and 1.45% 
Medicare tax on both employer and employee, for a total of 15.3%. I.R.C. §§ 3101-
3128 (1996).) The combination of the savings deduction from personal income and the 
payroll tax credit potentially will allow John and Joann to defer nearly indefinitely any 
tax burden, with their funds successfully extracted from the corporate solution and 
diversified. However, this is true only to the extent that the payroll tax credit offsets 
actual payroll taxes and the tax on wages paid. If the payroll tax credit is lower than 
the employer and employee regular tax rates, then the recharacterization of dividends as 
wages is less attractive to both parties. The nondeductibility of salaries at the business 
level, which is taxed at a rate of 11 %, will not, as presently proposed, be sufficiently 
mitigated by .the 7.65% payroll tax credit. Likewise, the taxability of wages to the 
employee at rates higher than the payroll tax credit only partially minimizes the tax 
burden. 
For further analysis, see Snyder & Gallegos, supra note 3, at 49-51 & nn.193-202. 
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higher marginal rate on their consumption under the USA tax than they 
would under the flat tax. But both systems bias investment decisions in 
favor of John and Joann leaving their profits in corporate solution. 
Under the flat tax, John and Joann gained an immediate return on 
investment by leaving their profits in corporate solution. The motivation 
is not as great under the USA tax as under the flat tax, because the 
business tax rate is eleven percent (USA) versus seventeen percent (flat). 
However, if the rates were equivalent, then the motivation would be no 
different. The variations in treatment could potentially lead to some 
very different decisions about consumption versus savings, depending 
upon which system they were taxed under.93 
The motivation for the business to borrow may even be greater under 
the USA tax,94 to the extent that the payroll tax credit provision does 
not provide an equivalent effect to the wage deduction available under 
the flat tax. 
3. Divorce and the Return of "Form is Substance" 
When John and Joann do divorce, matters start to vary under the USA 
tax depending on how the parties structure their transaction. Let us 
assume that Joann has her shares redeemed for the same note from the 
corporation as it was under the flat tax.95 Joann is separately liable for 
a tax on her realized gain as she receives it from Moriah.96 However, 
if she invests it, she will receive a deduction,97 but, to the extent that 
she consumes it, she will have to pay a tax. Her tax burden is entirely 
up to her, as is the timing of when she pays the tax. 
On the other side of the transaction, other things remaining equal, 
Moriah will make payments on its note to Joann directly from corporate 
profits, thus ensuring that the transaction bears a business level tax in the 
appropriate period because it cannot take a deduction for this payment. 
Thus, John, as the sole shareholder of the corporation after the purchase 
of Joann's stock, will be encouraged to negotiate with Joann to obtain 
a decrease in the redemption amount that reflects a more equal 
distribution of the tax burden between them. But, if John were to 
continue to invest in Moriah by either leaving the excess cash flow with 
the business, or by borrowing so as to expand more rapidly, the 
93. Any variation in decision-making finishes whatever tax equivalence there 
may have been to start with. 
94. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (for further discussion of borrowing). 
95. See supra note 63 (when appreciated property is distributed to shareholder 
instead of cash). 
96. S. 722, supra note 2, § 15. 
97. Id. §§ 50-58. 
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aggregate tax burden might be deferred well into the future, thus 
reducing the burden substantially. 
However, the tax consequences might vary if John were to buy 
Joann's stock directly from her for a note payable to her over ten years 
and then assign the note to Moriah. The USA tax defines income in 
much the same way as the current system.98 But the statute then 
creates a dichotomy between gratuitous discharge of indebtedness and 
discharge in return for "services, property or other valuable right."99 
If the corporation's assumption of the note were gratuitous, the 
consequence would be the same as if the original agreement had required 
the corporation to pay the note: John would not have any tax at the 
individual level. This is because the USA tax specifically excludes gifts 
from the individual tax base,100 just like the current system101 and the 
:flat tax.102 But this note potentially, at least, is taking the form of an 
employer gift to an employee. 
In order to prevent the potential for tax avoidance attendant to 
characterizing a commercial payment or compensation as a gift, the 
current Code does not extend its general exclusion-of-gift to employer 
gifts to employees. 103 The USA tax would seem to require the same 
exception, otherwise taxpayers could potentially exploit the gaping hole: 
Employers could disguise compensation in the form of gifts by assuming 
employee debts. Gain to the employee could be excluded from 
individual tax (as high as forty percent). But, if the USA tax does 
utilize the exception, then another problem could potentially force the 
individual to pay tax on "income" when no ca~h is received with which 
to pay it and with no opportunity to take a savings deduction. 104 This 
98. Income from discharge of indebtedness is included in the definition of income 
under S. 722, supra note 2, § 3(a)(10). 
99. Id. § 4(a)(9) (excluding from income discharge of indebtedness if not for 
"services, property or other valuable right"). 
100. S. 722, supra note 2, § 4(a)(3)(A). 
101. I.R.C. § 102(a) (1996). 
102. Hall and Rabushka would tax only "compensation," thus excluding gifts 
completely from the tax base. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 64, at 142, 144. 
103. I.R.C. § 102(c) (West 1995) ("Subsection (a) shall not exclude from gross 
income any amount transferred by or for an employer to, or for the benefit of, an 
employee.") This is because those from an employer to an employee are not true gifts. 
The inquiry focuses on whether the donor had a "detached and disinterested generosity." 
Id. 
104. S. 722, supra note 2, § 50. 
1509 
arises in the context of the fact pattern of Hayes, 105 discussed previous-
ly, in which "form" is sometimes deemed the "substance" in the current 
Code. 106 
This distinction made little difference under the flat tax because the 
entire transaction stood outside the tax base, where the assignment of the 
note was not defined as compensation.107 · However, under the USA 
tax, if John, as in Hayes, gave Joann a note in return for her stock, and 
then assigned the note to Moriah, two outcomes could occur. If it were 
classified as a gift-an anomalous result that would lead to the abuse 
described above-then no tax would be incurred because it would fall 
outside the tax base. Alternatively, if there were a ban on employ-
er/employee gifts, the government could enforce payment of tax on the 
value of the note as it is realized because it is not a gift, but a payment 
resulting from an employer-employee relationship since John is an 
owner-operator of the company. · 
An alternate ground for taxing the transaction can be found in another 
old case, Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 108 where discharge 
of an obligation by a third party r_esulted in a tax liability to the 
taxpayer. The effect of Moriah paying off John's note enriches him in 
just the same way that a corporation paying its president's income tax 
enriches the president. 109 The result would be the same to John 
regardless of the rationale-he would have to pay a tax on the note just 
as Mr. Hayes did when he bought out his wife. 110 But this outcome, 
which fits into the modified definition of income under the current 
system,111 would seem to run counter to the basic tenet of the USA 
tax-taxation of consumption--and deferral of taxes on savings. John 
will have to recognize the discharge of the note in a year in which he 
cannot realize a concomitant savings deduction, for he has nothing to 
deduct. He would presumably have already taken a deduction for the 
stock he originally purchased from Joann and then paid her on an 
installment basis using taxed income in repaying a debt. When the note 
is discharged by Moriah, he will then have income, but no cash with 
105. Hayes v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 593 (1993). 
106. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
107. Id. 
108. 279 U.S. 716 (1929). 
109. Id. The regulations also memorialize the cancellation of indebtedness of a 
shareholder by the corporation as a constructive dividend. Treas. Reg.§ 1.301-l(m) (as 
amended in 1995); see also supra note 32 (discussing constructive dividend treatment 
of below market interest rate loans between related persons); BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra 
note 35, ,r 8.05[6], at 8-46. 
110. Hayes v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 593 (1993). 
111. See Feld, supra note 28. 
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which to either pay the tax or purchase 1-1- savings instrument to avoid the 
tax. Merely by taking the primary obligation rather than letting Moriah 
redeem Joann, John will be materially worse off. This seems to echo the 
outcome of Rev. Rul. 69-608 that "form is the substance here"112-an 
outcome that tax reform is supposed to eliminate. 
4. Sale of the Business and Tax Planning Under the USA Tax 
If John finally sells to Moriah, years later at a much larger value than 
when Joann redeemed her share, he faces a tax burden unless he 
reinvests. He too, can plan his tax burden and the timing of when, if 
ever, he pays a tax. If John has continued to reinvest in the business 
over the course of time, he will have potentially deferred taxes--or at 
least a good deal of it-well into the future. John would face a potential 
tax burden personally, but only to the extent that he does not utilize the 
. savings deduction. 113 
III. THE USE OF TRUSTS: EXPLORING ALIMONY AND 
DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
"Put not your trust in money, but put your money in trust." 
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
The Autocrat of the 
Breakfast-Table II 
This part of the Article will explore, rather tentatively, how the flat tax 
and USA tax would change the basic structure of the current income tax 
treatment of trusts and estates. Because the proposals are incomplete 
and do not yet address some critical issues, our analysis is sometimes 
based on a blind-faith hope that we captured the essence of what the 
proponents have in mind. 
112. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 35, ,r 9.06[6], at 9-45 n.214. 
l 13. John would also be able to utilize such techniques as a "sale and seller 
redemption." See discussion supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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A. Taxation of Trusts Under Current Law114 
Trusts are separate legal entities that pay taxes on their current year's 
income, unless it is distributed to the beneficiaries ( or unless the income 
is taxed directly to the grantor who retained some controls over the 
trust-referred to as a grantor trust). Trust income is generally 
determined in the same manner as for individuals and corporations. 
Dividends, gains, losses, and expense deductions are included or 
subtracted from gross income to arrive at taxable income. fucome that 
is accumulated by the trust for later distribution to a beneficiary is taxed 
to the trust; the beneficiaries pay a tax on distribution under the so-called 
throwback rules, but the beneficiary receives a tax credit (with limits) for 
the tax paid by the trust. 115 In 1993, Congress compressed the tax 
rates for trusts and estates so that the highest individual rate bracket 
(39.6%) starts at $7,900 of taxable income.116 
Although a creature of British common law, dating back to the Statute 
of Uses in 1535,117 and as someone once suggested, perhaps "con-
ceived in sin as a device to hide money from the King," the trust has 
become an integral part of American life. Because it is utilized as a 
means of dividing ownership of property into two historically denomi-
nated components-"legal" title and "equitable" title-it serves a wide 
number of purposes. By transferring legal title to property to a trustee, 
a settlor (grantor) can assure herself that a beneficiary (the equitable 
owner) will not have direct access to the trust property or that the 
property will be managed by the trustee so as to minimize the chance of 
its being dissipated. Conversely, in the alimony context, trusts offer the 
beneficiary spouse a measure of assurance that she will receive the 
support payments without the need to rely on periodic checks issued by 
the payor spouse. The trustee is also subject to a higher fiduciary duty 
than is an individual. However, trusts have historically been an ideal 
way to reduce one's tax burden. Examples of this are: (1) by shifting 
income-producing property to a lower bracket family member (but the 
increased rates on trusts starting with 1993 have curtailed this advan-
114. Our discussion of the income taxation of trusts under Subchapter J, I.R.C. 
§§ 641-692, will apply generally to estates as well. 
115. I.R.C. §§ 661-668 (1996). 
116. Id. § l(e). These higher rates provide a disincentive for accumulation of 
income in a trust or estate and place into question the continued use of trusts for 
assignment of income purposes. However, the trust vehicle still offers estate and gift 
tax and generation skipping opportunities, as well as the traditional non-tax reasons for 
creating a trust in the first place. 
117. 27 Hen. 8, ch. 10. 
1512 
[VOL. 33: 1485, 1996] Evaluating the Consumption Tax Proposals 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
tage ); (2) by avoiding a purportedly burdensome tax rule not applicable 
to trusts or their beneficiaries--alimony, for example;"8 and (3) by 
generating a current charitable deduction for a contribution of a 
remainder interest in property retained for a donor's use for the rest of 
her life. 119 These multiple types of trusts, while convenient for those 
taxpayers able to use them, create problems in resolving a number of 
income tax issues under our current system. 120 
Among the problems and issues are: (1) the role of state law in 
determining what is property ("corpus") and what is income; (2) the 
interrelationship between direct (non-trust) gifts of property and gifts of 
income; (3) the remaining role of assignment of income; (4) the timing 
and characterization of gains; (5) the difference between taxing the trust 
and taxing the beneficiary; and ( 6) what to do about expenses incurred 
by the trust on behalf of the beneficiary (more of a problem in a 
consumption tax system). 
B. Alimony Trusts 
1. Fact Pattern 
In contrast to the facts of the Ames case, 121 where Joann owned one-
half of the family corporation stock, let us assume instead that another 
couple, Tom and Sue, are involved. Tom owns all the stock in a highly 
profitable fast food franchise (Max's Inc.) under a license and operating 
118. For example, the limitation on "front-loading of alimony payments" (to 
distinguish spousal support from property settlements) and the requirement that liability 
for alimony payments ceases at the death of the payee spouse, under the alimony rules 
in I.R.C. §§ 7l(b), (f), can be avoided by using an alimony trust under I.R.C. § 682. 
119. E.g., I.R.C. § 664 (1996). 
120. Two of the many books on the income tax issues in trusts are: (1) HOWARD 
M. ZARITSKY & NORMAN M. LANE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND 
TRUSTS (2d ed. 1993); and (2) Donna L. Seiden & Nicholas E. Christin, Income 
Taxation of Trusts and Estates, [Estates, Gifts & Trusts] Tax Mgmt. Portfolios (BNA), 
No. 852 (1996). The IRS, Statistics oflncome Division, publishes helpful tax return data 
on a number of entities. Unfortunately, the latest information for estates and trusts was 
published in 1985 (for the 1982 study). While this is critical data in evaluating any 
reforms or abuses in the trusts and estates area, the IRS states that budgetary restraints 
have prevented more current studies. See Letter from Thomas B. Petska, Chief, Special 
Studies and Publications Branch, Statistics oflncome Division, Internal Revenue Service, 
Washington, D.C., to Prof. Lester B. Snyder, Professor of Law, Univ. of San Diego 
School of Law (Oct. 9, 1996) (on file with the Authors). 
121. See discussion supra Part II. 
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agreement with the national franchisor. Sue owns no stock and her 
former spouse, Tom., agrees to satisfy his entire marital obligation to her 
by creating an alimony trust. Under the terms of the trust agreement, 
Tom. would transfer one-half his stock in the franchise to the trust. 122 
The income from. the trust (dividends paid by the corporation) would be 
paid to Sue for 15 years as the main source of spousal support; and at 
the end of that period the trust would end, with the stock reverting back 
to Tom., assuming they have no children. The trust would be otherwise 
irrevocable, and the trustee would be a bank. The corporation will 
guarantee payment of an eight percent dividend (from. its pre-tax profits) 
on the $800,000 worth of stock being transferred to the trust. Tom's tax 
basis in the stock, which he originally received as an inheritance from. 
his parents, is $200,000.123 
2. Results Under Current Law 
If Tom. had retained full ownership of the stock and had paid over the 
dividends he received to his ex-spouse as alimony, Tom. would have first 
included the dividends in his gross income. Assuming section 71 of the 
Code were otherwise com.plied with, 124 Sue would include the support 
payments in her gross income and Tom. would be entitled to a deduction 
from. gross income. 125 In effect, Tom. would be allowed to assign or 
shift his income to Sue under a statutory regime created in 1942, as an 
exception to the fundamental principle prohibiting assignments of 
income (to preserve the graduated tax rate structure), as encunciated by 
Justice Holm.es in the classic case of Lucas v. Earl. 126 
122. We are assuming that the franchisor would permit Tom to transfer one-half his 
stock to a trust without violating their policy ofrestricting stock ownership only to those 
who are active managers. We are further assuming that there are no issues raised 
because of one person owning 100% of the stock, although, as will be developed in the 
next segment on deferred compensation trusts, Tom plans to expand the corporation by 
acquiring additional franchises and by issuing stock to three or four new unrelated 
investors. 
123. We are assuming the inherited stock is not community property. 
124. Among § 71 requirements for payments to a spouse to be deemed taxable 
alimony are (1) that they are made in "cash", (2) that they end at the death of the payee 
spouse, (3) that there is no front-end loading (substantially higher payments in the first 
three years), and ( 4) that they are made under a court decree or court approved 
agreement. I.R.C. § 71 (1996). 
125. Id. § 215. The same result would occur if Tom received a salary from the 
corporation ( deductible by the corporation if "reasonable") and paid the alimony out of 
that salary. See discussion of converting "wages" income to dividend income, supra Part 
II.C.2, and infra Parts III.B.3-4, under the flat tax and USA tax discussions. 
126. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). Prior to 1942, alimony was neither deductible by the 
payor, nor taxable to the payee spouse. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917). In 1942, 
Congress changed this result by enacting what are now I.R.C. §§ 71, 215. 
1514 
[VOL. 33: 1485, 1996] Evaluating the Consumption Tax Proposals 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
By transferring the stock to an alimony trust, we move to a different 
set of rules. Tom's stock transfer to the trust generates a realized gain 
of $600,000 (assumed fair market value of $800,000 less adjusted basis 
of $200,000). 127 However, the enactment in 1984 of I.R.C. section 
1041 results in non-recognition of that gain, in effect allowing the 
transferor to escape tax on the realized gain, by shifting the burden to 
the transferee spouse who assumes the tax basis of the transferor. 128 
Section 1041 applies to a transfer in trust as well. Thus, the alimony 
trust for Sue will result in the trust carryover of Tom's $200,000 basis, 
but assuming the trustee has no power to sell the stock during the 
fifteen-year term., there should be no further sale or distribution of the 
stock by the trust during that period.129 The 1984 enactment of section 
1041 has made the alimony trust a more attractive vehicle. 
Once the stock is in an alimony trust, the spousal support provisions 
of sections 71 and 215 no longer apply. Instead, the taxation of the 
income derived by the trust is governed by the provisions of Subchapter · 
J-the rules applicable to trusts and beneficiaries. 130 The recipient 
127. I.R.C. § 1001 (1996). For potential "special valuation" gift tax issue on 
transfers in trust for "family" members, where transferor retains an interest, see Id. 
§ 2702. The income tax definition of "gift" does not necessarily mesh with the gift or 
estate tax definition. See, e.g., Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2nd 
Cir. 1947). 
128. I.R.C. § 1041(b) (1996). Prior to 1984, a transfer of property to a spouse as 
part of a divorce was deemed a taxable event to the transferor. U.S. v. Davis, 370 U.S. 
65 (1962). The transferee spouse was not taxed on the property received and was 
allowed a stepped-up basis to its fair market value. Rev. Ru!. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63. 
Davis generated a host of problems, including the imposition of a heavy tax burden on 
the couple at an inopportune time, the lack of cash to pay the tax, the disparity between 
common-law state taxpayers and community property state taxpayers (where division of 
marital property was often inherently a tax-free equal division of jointly owned 
property), and the claimed whipsaw effect on the IRS where the transferor paid no tax, 
but the transferee received a fair market value basis. For a discussion of § 1041 
rationales, see Asimow, supra note 50. 
129. Complications arise in cases where the trust (or an estate) distributes property 
in satisfaction of a bequest or devise where the beneficiary is entitled, under state law, 
to a specific dollar amount or to specific property other than that distributed. I.R.C. 
§ 643(d) (West 1995); Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.661(a)-2(f)(l) (as amended 1973). See 
ZARITSKY & LANE, supra note 120, ,r 4.11 (for full discussion of this issue); see also 
Seiden & Christin, supra note 120, at A-78. This appears to be a vestige of the rule that 
satisfaction of a debt which generates gain results in tax to the debtor (the trust in this 
case-when the specific property received by the beneficiary is not the specific property 
willed to her). 
130. I.R.C. § 682 (1996). It has been suggested that "wealthy individuals originated 
such 'alimony trusts' as an income-shifting device in the era before an alimony 
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spouse is taxable on the amount of trust income she is entitled to 
receive. The spouse who created the trust is not entitled to any 
deduction. In other words, Tom, in our example, would not be allowed 
a deduction for the dividend income generated by the trust he created. 
Technically, the dividend income would be included in the trust's 
income, but the trust would deduct the amount it was required to 
distribute to Sue, the sole beneficiary. 131 Section 682 creates an 
exception to the grantor trust rules132 when normally a grantor, such 
as Tom, would be taxed on the trust income: (1) when the trust was 
used.to pay his obligations; (2) when the trust was revocable or subject 
to a reversion in the grantor; or (3) when the trust was otherwise under 
his control. As a result, section 682 by-passes the grantor trust rules 
where the income (and expenses) of the trust are attributed to the grantor 
to be reported on his own return as if no trust existed. 
The alimony trust does, however, raise a number of troublesome 
issues. To mention a few, the statute allocates the "amount of income 
of any trust" to the beneficiary spouse. Some confusion has developed 
in determining whether tax-exempt interest is taxable to the spouse, 
though not taxable to the trust. I.R.C. section 652(b ), which states that 
income shall retain the same character as in the hands of the trust, would 
supposedly resolve that issue, but the IRS has litigated this point with 
mixed success. Another issue is whether the section 682 format is upset 
where the grantor retains the right to allocate income among beneficia-
ries, thereby taxing the grantor and not the beneficiary or trust. 
Questions arise on child support payments. Section 682 specifically 
excludes from its ambit amounts paid for child support, creating an 
allocation problem in cases where the trust instrument is not carefully 
drafted. 133 
The alimony trust rules do, however, have some advantages for the 
grantor. The restrictions in section 71, requiring alimony to end at the 
death of the recipient spouse, and the front-end loading rules are not 
applicable under section 682 trusts. 
deduction was permitted by the Code". MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 484 (3d ed. 1995). 
131. I.R.C. §§ 651, 652 (1996). 
132. Id. §§ 671-678. · 
133. For detailed discussion of these issues, see Roland L. Hjorth, Divorce, Taxes, 
and the 1984 Tax Reform Act: An Inadequate Response To An Old Problem, 6 l WASH. 
L. REV. 151 (1986). 
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3. Results Under the Flat Tax 
How would Tom, Sue, and their alimony trust fare under the proposed 
fiat tax? 
The proposal is silent on the taxation of trusts and estates. The fiat tax 
statute is deceptively simple; the entire tax portion is contained in fewer 
than twenty pages. Since the alimony trust in our illustrative case is not 
a "business activity,"134 it is not a taxable entity. The original propo-
nents of the fiat tax, Professors Hall and Rabushka, provide some clue 
in the question and answer chapter of their book: 
Q: What about nonbusiness entities such as trusts, estates .... 
A: [A] conventional personal trust, which holds stock[ s] and bonds, deals 
entirely in after-tax income, so there is no reason for the tax system to pay 
attention to it. 135 · . 
It is thus reasonable to assume that the intention of the proponents is not 
to tax the trust or its beneficiaries! This would herald the end of 
Subchapter J of the Code in what may first appear to be an unprecedent-
ed simplification of the income tax system. The presumption is that 
dividend or interest income has already been subject to one layer of tax 
at the business level (taking as a given that the business tax was not 
passed on to the consumer),136 and to tax it again would contradict the 
removal of the double tax curse from the new tax regime. 
While Tom, Sue, and the alimony trust would thus avoid tax on the 
trust income, this is arguably the same result as when Tom or Sue 
owned the stock directly. Dividends are simply not taxed to anyone. 137 
134. H.R. 2060, supra note I, §§ l l(a)-(b). 
135. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 64, at 126. 
136. In this Symposium, see Schenk, supra, note 86, and Reuven S. A vi-Yonah, 
From Income to Consumption Tax: Some International Implications, 33 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1329 (1997) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Income to Consumption]. See also Reuven 
S. Avi-Yonah, The International Implications of Tax Reform, 69 TAX NOTES 913,918 
(1995) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, International Implications]. 
137. While this may create an incentive in the closely-held corporation to leave the 
profits with the corporation to allow it to expand, the non-taxability of dividends may 
have the unintended result in a publicly-held corporation. These shareholders may 
pressure management to declare dividends, thereby creating the potential for less growth 
in our major corporations. Cf ALVIN C. WARREN, JR., AMERICAN LAW INST., FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME 
TAXES, REPORTER'S STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX (1993) (report recommends a corporate 
level withholding tax which would be offset against taxable dividends to shareholders). 
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Similarly, Tom would have no tax on the transfer of appreciated stock 
to the trust, even without the help of a non-recognition provision such 
as section 1041. Since the tax base under the flat tax includes only 
"cash wages," any gain on the transfer of property to anyone is 
inherently not taxed. · · 
However, tax reform comes with a new premium on tax planning, 
with higher stakes involved than under current law. If, instead of 
funding his alimony obligation through the transfer of stock to a trust for 
Sue, Tom were to take a salary, of say $120,000, from the corporation, 
out of which he paid Sue $60,000 in spousal support, Tom would remain 
taxable on the entire $120,000, with no deduction for the $60,000 
alimony payment. Sue would not be taxed on the alimony, leaving her 
with more spendable income than Tom. The flat tax proposed rate of 
seventeen percent on Tom's income ($20,400), less the $60,000 paid 
over to Sue, leaves Tom with a spendable income of $39,600, compared 
to $60,000 for Sue. There is no obvious rationale for this result offered 
by the flat tax proponents. This appears to discriminate against those 
who receive their income from services in favor of those who have the 
means and ability to transfer the amount of capital necessary to yield the 
equivalent alimony to the recipient spouse. 138 It is not an assignment 
of income problem, which is non-existent in a flat tax world. 139 In 
other words, the goal of eliminating double taxation comes with a high 
price tag, at least in this context, for those who render services. 140 
The newly-created incentive in favor of dividend income versus salary 
also reverses the roles of government and shareholder-employees of 
closely-held corporations. Under current law, there is generally an 
advantage for the shareholder-employee to take a higher salary, thereby 
reducing the corporate level tax (and the concommitant double tax 
burden). Dividends, as such, are not deductible by corporations under 
Ostensibly the same issue is presented, but at least one tax would be collected. 
138. Michael J. McIntyre and C. Eugene Steuerle recognize this disparity, adding 
that elimination of the alimony deduction "would complicate life for former spouses who 
reached divorce settlements before enactment of the flat tax." However, they point out 
that the alimony deduction reduces taxes paid by the couples in the aggregate, resulting 
in higher rates for other taxpayers. They further conclude that the impact of the taxation 
of alimony payments in families with children is unclear. McINTYRE & STEUERLE, 
supra note 5, at 47-48. 
139. But the family allowance (up to $21,400 as proposed) would create some 
incentive to shift income at the lower end of the income scale. This would also retain 
the "marriage penalty" at that level. See Edward J. McCaffery, Equality of the Right 
Sort, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 289 (1996). 
140. The flat tax methodology for curing the double tax on savings and capital 
investment, by taxing only wage income, should be compared with the more equitable 
(yet more complex) structure of the USA tax, in which all income is taxed in the first 
instance, with a deduction for savings. See discussion supra note 4. 
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current law, but "reasonable" salaries paid for services are deductible to 
the corporation. 141 The taxpayer-shareholder is thus put in the position 
of defending her salary against the IRS argument that a portion of the 
salary is merely a disguised dividend. Under the flat tax, the govern-
ment would prefer "salary" rather than "dividend" treatment. As for 
Tom in our hypothetical case, the real difference between salary and 
dividend, in an economic sense (at least while he is sole owner of the 
corporate stock), may well be illusory, but the tax consequences are not. 
The alimony trust, in a flat tax world, would be a more advantageous 
way to meet one's support obligations than under current law, at least 
for . higher income taxpayers with ample property to fund the trust. 
Taxpayers who are unable to fund an alimony trust with capital are left 
in the position of taxing the wage earning spouse on the entire income, 
creating spendable income disparities. 
4. Results Under the USA Tax 
In contrast to the simplified, but narrower, tax base of the flat tax, the 
USA tax is much more complex. The individual side of the USA tax is 
levied at graduated rates (from eight to forty percent) on worldwide net 
income (gross income, as we now know it, less a redefined list of 
deductions)142 of U.S. citizens and resident aliens.143 The "Big Pine-
141. I.R.C. § 162(a)(l) (1996); cf id. § 162(m) (limiting deductions for salary paid 
to certain top executives to $1,000,000, unless the higher amount is based on 
performance standards). 
142. Among the deductions allowed are: child support payments (expanding the 
alimony deduction), personal and dependency exemptions, and increased standard 
deduction ("Family Living Allowance"), a more limited mortgage interest deduction, a 
new education deduction ($2,000 for each student), a charitable deduction, and a general 
basis account (primarily a transition adjustment) for those assets acquired under the pre-
consumption tax regime. S. 722, supra note 2, §§ 5,6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 57. A new credit 
for social security taxes paid by businesses and individuals is allowed. Id. §§ 21, 281-
283. 
143. Id. §§ I, 2, 15. The business component of the USA tax, an 11 % value added 
type tax, includes only sales in the United States, which opens up a number of 
international tax issues. See Avi-Yonah, Income to Consumption, supra note 136; Avi-
Yonah, International Implications, supra note 136 (discussions of GATT issues raised 
by these proposals). A major asserted advantage of a destination principle VAT is that 
it results in export/import neutrality trade by allowing border tax rebates for exports and 
imposing a tax on imports. The flat tax on businesses does not allow for border rebates 
on exports. Cf H.R. 4050, supra note 2 (adopting a modified VAT/income tax system 
with tax rebates for exports similar to the USA tax). 
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apple"144 in the USA tax is the "unlimited savings account" for new 
net savings. 145 Savings includes investments in stock, bonds, and other 
securities, but excludes investment in land and certain other real estate 
and certain tangible personal property, such as coins, stamps, and other 
collectibles. 146 Withdrawals from savings (unless resaved) are tax-
able.147 Unlike the classic consumption tax, borrowed money is 
generally not included in income, thus, interest and principal payments 
are not deductible. 148 
Returning to our illustrative case of Tom and Sue, the first question 
relates to Tom's transfer of one-half his corporate stock to an alimony 
trust for Sue. 149 Our search of the USA tax statute, as proposed, found 
144. Taken from Martin D. Ginsburg, Life Under a Personal Consumption Tax: 
Some Thoughts on Working, Saving, and Consuming in Nunn-Domenici 's Tax World, 48 
NAT. TAX J. 585, 588 (1995). 
145. S. 722, supra note 2, §§ 50-58. 
146. Id. § 53. 
147. Id. § 54. 
148. However, the USA tax attempts to curtail the use of borrowed money to save. 
Except for certain types of debt, such as mortgage debt on a principal residence and 
consumer debt up to $25,000, borrowing will generally reduce (but not below zero) the 
"net savings" deduction. JCT REPORT, supra note 2, at 3602. As Professor Alvin C. 
Warren, Jr., notes, by allowing a deduction for "net savings," the USA tax does not 
follow "the standard cash flow tax design of including all receipts (including borrowed 
receipts) and deducting all nonconsumption payments (including payments of interest and 
loan principal)." He then demonstrates that the USA tax method is more complex than 
the standard model and does not always "properly account for liabilities". Alvin C. 
Warren, Jr., The Proposal For An "Unlimited Savings Allowance," 68 TAX NOTES 1103, 
1104 (1995); see also Committee on Simplification American Bar Association Section 
of Taxation, Complexity and the Personal Consumption Tax, 35 TAX LAW. 415 (1982); 
NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955); Andrews, supra note 86; Lee A. 
Sheppard, The Consumption Tax: Borrowing as a Tax Shelter, 68 TAX NOTES 138 
(1995) (discussing debt issues in both flat tax and USA tax). 
149. We are assuming throughout this Article that all transactions and events 
occurred after the enactment of each of these proposals. Thus, the transition problems 
that would exist by transferring pre-USA tax stock-where the basis of the stock 
represents after-tax capital and would require a mechanism to avoid taxing it again under 
the new tax system-is not discussed here. Transition issues have been widely 
discussed. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986); Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of 
Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977); Shounak Sarker 
& George Z. Zodrow, Transitional Issues in Moving to a Direct Consumption Tax, 46 
NAT'L TAX J. 359 (1993); Louis Kaplow, Recovery of Pre-Enactment Basis Under a 
Consumption Tax: The USA Tax System, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 171-47, Aug. 28, 1995, 
available in Westlaw, TNT database, 95 TNT 171-4 7 ( citing David F. Bradford, 
Consumption Taxes: Some Fundamental Transition Issues (forthcoming)). Some 
commentators take the position (perhaps an extreme one) that a new tax system is 
doomed because of the transition problems, notwithstanding instances of major changes 
in the tax law in the past 70-80 years. Granted these changes were not as formidable 
as would be required to move to a consumption tax, many of the concepts of current law 
would attach to the consumption tax proposals discussed in this Article. See, e.g., Lewis 
Lyons, Pearlman: Transition Problems May Stop Reform, But Not an Add-On VAT, 96 
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no specific provision on alimony trusts (a section 682 analogue) and no 
provision on non-recognition of gain on spousal transfers in trust or 
otherwise (similar to section 1041 of current law). However, the answer 
might be built into the larger structure of the proposed statute itself. 
The USA tax excludes the gain on the appreciated stock from the 
general gross income rules. 150 The withdrawal from savings rules in 
the unlimited saving account deduction would tax the transfer of stock 
(a savings asset) to a trust, but the trust provisions in the USA tax trump 
the general rule by not taxing transfers of savings assets to a trust. 151 
The rationale for not taxing the transfer of stock to Tom's ex-spouse 
may be to treat the transfer as a gift of appreciated property, similar to 
current section 1041, even though the transfer is obligatory, as opposed 
to gratuitous. The trust, or Sue, would presumably take Tom's basis 
($200,000) for the stock. But why only transfers to a trust? If Tom had 
transferred the stock to Sue outright in a divorce property settlement 
( disregarding community property issues by assuming Tom inherited the 
stock from his parents), would it be a gift or a taxable transfer?152 
If Tom has no new investments or savings in that year to offset the 
gain on the transfer of the stock, his tax liability under the USA tax 
could be as high as $320,000 (forty percent x $800,000). Using more 
familiar jargon, his "realized" and "recognized" gain is the excess of the 
fair market value of the stock ($800,000) less its basis ($0), or 
$800,000.153 Tom was allowed to deduct the full cost of the stock 
($200,000) at the time of purchase (in a post-USA tax year), and has 
therefore previously recovered his investment. 
TAX NOTES TODAY 158-1, Aug. 13, 1996, available in Westlaw, TNT database, 96 TNT 
158-1 (interview with Ronald A. Pearlman, former Chief qf Staff of the Joint Committee 
on Taxation). 
150. S. 722, supra note 2, § 3(a)(l 1) This section defines income to include: 
"Gains on the sale or disposition of assets ( other than savings assets)." Apart from the 
parenthetical exclusion of "savings assets," this is analogous to § 1001 in the current 
I.RC. 
151. Id. § 54(a)(l). 
152. Id. § 56(c)(l) (section is directed at "gratuitous" transfers by "donors"). 
153. This is a return to the pre-section 1041 era (pre-1984), when the decision in 
U.S. v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), holding a transfer of appreciated property in 
exchange for the release of marital property rights incident to divorce, was a taxable 
event to the transferror. The policy reasons for the enactment of§ 1041, discussed supra 
note 48 and accompanying text, do not disappear in the USA tax, and thus a § 1041 
analogue should be added to the proposal. 
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Assume, however, that the rules applicable to gratuitous transfers are 
also applicable to obligatory family transfers such as spousal support. 
The USA tax treats a "gift" of a non-cash saving asset as non-taxable 
(not deemed a "withdrawal") to the donor. 154 The receipt of the gift 
(or bequest) by the donee is not taxable, and the donee takes the donor's 
basis, if any, in the asset. There is no new savings deduction for the 
donee unless the asset is sold and the proceeds reinvested. 155 Cash 
gifts, such as withdrawal of money from a checking account, will 
presumably constitute taxable withdrawals to the donor.156 Since the 
cash has been taxed, it has a basis ( disregarding the difficulty in tracing 
basis in fungible property) equal to the amount of cash. The donee has 
no income on receipt of the cash, and if she saves it, the donee would 
be entitled to a full savings deduction. 157 In any event, on a transfer 
of a savings asset to an alimony trust as a non-cash gift by Tom, Sue 
and the trust itself would have no tax, but the trust would have a zero 
basis (assuming Tom deducted the purchase of the stock in prior years). 
The trust and beneficiary would then be taxed on the income from the 
stock, as will be described below. 
The combination of the limited definition of a savings asset and the 
ability to borrow money to purchase a non-savings asset tax free, may 
well confirm the drafters' fears that the tax bar "is poised to do them 
in."158 Professor Martin Ginsburg notes that the anti-abuse provi-
sions159 "sprinkled about the USA Tax," such as concerns that taxpay-
ers will borrow against their savings to consume (instead of withdrawing 
the savings), suggest that there are inherent basic faults in the unlimited 
savings allowance. 16° For example, it is possible that none of the anti-
abuse rules in section 58 of the USA tax prevent Tom from borrowing 
$800,000, using a nonsavings asset, such as land or his personal 
residence, or his deceased mother's jewelry collection as security, and 
transferring the funds to an alimony trust, thus avoiding the withdrawal 
tax. (Simply borrowing against his stock may be caught by one of the 
anti-abuse rules, providing the Treasury Department adopts appropriate 
154. S. 722, supra note 2, § 56(c)(l). 
155. Id. §§ 4(a)(3), 56(c)(l), 56(c)(3), 4(a)(12). Note that there is no need for the 
stepped-up basis rule in I.RC. § 1014 under the USA tax (or the flat tax either), since 
savings assets are fully deductible at the time of acquisition, and non-savings assets are 
not on the favored "species" list. 
156. Id. § 56(c)(3). 
157. Id. § 56(c)(3). 
158. Ginsberg, supra note 144, at 590. 
159. E.g., S. 722, supra note 2, § 58. 
160. Ginsburg, supra note 144, at 590. For a critique of the the unlimited savings 
account and the use of borrowed money, see Warren, supra note 148. 
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regulations. 161) The complicated rules applicable to the taxation of 
trusts would not seem to attribute any trust activity to the grantor, Tom, 
during the fifteen-year term of the trust, taxing only the beneficiary on 
distributions of trust income (and certain expenses incurred on her 
behalf). 162 Many more planning opportunities would undoubtedly 
surface. 163 
Under the USA tax, Tom and Sue do have the option to have Tom 
pay his alimony directly to Sue without the intervention of a trust. 
Unlike the flat tax, the USA tax provides for the inclusion in income of 
alimony (and child support) by the payee spouse and a deduction to the 
payor spouse. 164 The alimony rules are not as restrictive as the current 
law (for example, there are no front-end loading rules). 
Assuming, however, that an alimony trust is workable for both 
spouses, what are the likely tax consequences to the parties? The USA 
tax does not tax trusts, but only distributions to beneficiaries.165 While 
the grantor trust rules (not defined) are said to apply, 166 there is no 
provision, such as section 682 under current law, where the grantor trust 
rules are overridden in alimony trusts, taxing the trust income to the 
recipient spouse. 167 If the grantor trust rules do apply to the transferror 
161. S. 722, supra note 2, § 58(c). 
162. Id. §§ 141-146. 
163. Professor Ginsburg posits the case of a wealthy person who borrows $12 
million, secured by his residence, and then buys collectibles or land (non-savings assets). 
Over the years, he turns these assets back into cash and then consumes it. "He never 
borrows against his savings." Professor Ginsburg believes none of the anti-abuse rules 
reach this case. Ginsburg, supra note 144, at 596-97. Those who are studying the 
impact of the USA tax on behavioral and economic effects of the proposal should 
consider the range of activity non-savers might enjoy without paying taxes. 
164. S. 722, supra note 2, §§ 3(a)(7), 5. 
165. Id. §§ 141-146. 
166. Id. § 144(a) ("The provisions of this subchapter [dealing with trusts and 
estates] shall apply to grantor trusts only if the grantor is an individual."). Employer-
created deferred compensation trusts under current law are taxed as grantor trusts in 
some instances, I.R.C. §§ 402,404 (1996), but where the employer is a corporation, the 
USA tax appears to hang that issue in limbo. 
167. See discussion of § 682, supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. 
Generally, a grantor trust is one where the grantor and not the trust or beneficiaries is 
taxed on the trust income. I.R.C. §§ 671-679 (1996). The rationale for taxing the 
grantor under these sections is based on retained control (such as a right to revoke the 
trust or the use of trust income to pay the grantor's obligations, including spousal 
support). Were the USA tax not to include a § 682 type provision, the grantor of an 
alimony trust could, arguably, be taxed on the trust income. Presumably, the grantor 
would then be allowed to deduct the amount paid as alimony to his ex-spouse. For a 
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spouse, many alimony trusts would lose their purpose---to avoid the 
alimony inclusion and deduction rules of sections 71 and 215. 
In a major change from present law, the USA tax does not impose an 
income tax on non-business trusts. 168 The income is instead taxed only 
when distributed to the beneficiaries of the trust. 169 Advocates of the 
USA tax offer this rationale for not taxing the trust as a separate entity: 
"It is easiest to see why trusts and estates are not subject to the 
Individual Tax by viewing them as complex savings or brokerage 
accounts for their beneficiaries."170 While in part true, the multitude 
of different types of trusts in our country, ranging from estate and family 
trusts, charitable trusts, personal residence trusts, land conservation 
trusts, voting trusts, alimony trusts, to qualified S corporation trusts, each 
having its raison d'etre, cover a variegated catch far beyond mere 
"savings or brokerage accounts." Eliminating a centralized taxable entity 
for trust income, and deferring tax until ( or unless) distributed to 
beneficiaries, will increase opportunities for the type of tax avoidance 
which is not necessarily consistent with the goals of the USA tax. 171 
Trust income can be accumulated and reinvested for periods of time, 172 
through a non-taxable entity not subject to the savings and withdrawal 
rules, with no tax until the income is distributed. Given the value of 
deferral, enormous sums of tax revenue could be lost. The comparison 
to the present pass-through entities, such as partnerships and S corpora-
tions, where the owners are taxed on each year's income, whether or not 
distributed, is not applicable to the schematic proposed by the USA tax. 
Trusts with more than one beneficiary (spouse and children, for 
example) could be drafted to allow for distributions to one beneficiary 
one year and another beneficiary the next. Since trust income account-
complete discussion of the taxation of grantor trusts and the many related questions, see 
ZARITSKY & LANE, supra note 120, ~ 17.01. 
168. S. 722, supra note 2, §§ 141(a),(b). 
169. Id. § 14l(d). 
170. Ernest S. Christian & George J. Schutzer, Alliance USA, Unlimited Savings 
Allowance (USA) Tax System (prepared for Alliance USA), reprinted in 66 TAX NOTES 
1481, 1546 (1995). 
171. In the income tax context, early doubts as to the constitutional validity of 
taxing shareholders on undistributed corporate income (a by-product of Eisner v. 
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)) were laid to rest when Congress revised its method of 
taxing accumulated earnings of corporations in 1921 by taxing the corporate entity rather 
than the shareholders. See also, Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282 
(1938). 
172. Subchapter J of the current I.R.C. has an elaborate (yet complex) set of rules 
for distinguishing income from corpus, including the coordination of the trust instrument 
with state law. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT (1962 Act), 7B 
U.L.A. 150; Cal. Revised Principal & Income Act, CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 16301-315 
(Deering 1991). 
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ing and allocations between principal and income are critical components 
of "distributable net income," the need exists for allocation and ordering 
in the distribution rules. By taxing only the beneficiaries, where the 
trust has charitable or tax-exempt organizations or non-resident aliens as 
beneficiaries, no trust income will ever be taxed. 
There is a novel attempt in the USA tax to purportedly reduce the use 
of a trust to pay expenses that may not have been deductible by the 
beneficiaries had they paid the expenses out of their own pockets. Food, 
clothing, shelter, and pleasure autos come to mind, but many other 
consumption items could also be paid by the trust. There are two 
mechanisms to control this. The first, when there is only one beneficiary 
of the trust, is to have a "deemed" or constructive distribution of the 
amount of these expenses; and the second, when there are multiple 
beneficiaries, is to levy a special "proxy" tax on the trust itself, at the 
highest marginal tax rate for individuals (forty percent). 173 
The USA tax trust and estate provisions include some fairly compre-
hensive transition rules, which require separating the assets that were 
held by the trust before the effective date of the USA tax system ("initial 
assets") from those acquired after the effective date ("new assets"). 174 
In summary, as for Tom and Sue, assuming these rules allow them to 
use an alimony trust, Tom could probably transfer one-half his corporate 
stock to the trust with no tax. 175 The trust itself would take his zero 
basis (given that Tom deducted the amount he paid for the stock at the 
time of purchase). Sue would not be taxed until she received a 
distribution of trust income or had some personal expenses paid by the 
trust. If the parties could arrange their divorce settlement so that Sue 
did not require all the trust income for her support, a significant amount 
of dividend income received from the corporation could be reinvested by 
173. S. 722, supra note 2, § 143. 
174. Id. § 141(d). Special basis rules and different rules for cash and in-kind 
property are also present in the USA tax rules. A "previously taxed amount" (PT A) and 
"non-previously taxed amount" (Non-PTA) are concepts included in the proposal which 
are supposedly necessary to avoid taxing previously taxed income or capital again. Id. 
§ 142. 
175. We are assuming, for this illustration, that the trust is allowed to hold the 
corporate stock, even though Sue is the beneficiary of the trust which is a 50% 
shareholder, and that the "prohibited transaction" excise tax would not apply to this type 
of nonqualified deferred plan. 
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the trust,176 thereby reducing its current "distributable" income to Sue. 
Thus, there appears to be ample room for tax deferral on the corporate 
dividends or any other income received by the trust. Tom, of course, 
avoids the dividend tax altogether, but he also loses the income for the 
period the stock is held in trust. 
When compared to current law, in which Sue or the trust would be 
taxed each year on the trust income, the flat tax offers the best deal by 
never taxing anyone on the dividend income. The USA tax generally 
places second best, although there is the possibility of tax-free accumula-
tion of trust income. This accumulated income could be used, perhaps, 
to pay some expenses that arguably would not be deductible by Sue had 
she paid them herself (lawyers fees, for example). Additionally; some 
tax-free borrowing by the trust would provide more potential tax 
avoidance fodder, all of this without necessarily using the alimony trust 
exclusively as a "savings" or "brokerage" account, as the proponents of 
the USA tax would lead us to believe. Postponing the payment of tax 
is also still a formidable part of these proposals. 
C. Deferred Compensation Trusts: (The "Non-Qualified" Type) 
1. Fact Pattern 
After his divorce from Sue, Tom expanded his fast food franchise 
operations. He formed a new corporation, Apple Valley, Inc. (Apple), 
which entered into agreements with Boston Foods, Inc., a national 
franchisor, to own and operate four franchise locations. Tom brought in 
three additional, unrelated investors in Apple, with each investor, 
including Tom, owning one~ fourth of the common stock of Apple. 
Apple became highly profitable in a short period of time. Tom managed 
these franchises. There was a "qualified" retirement plan177 for the 
regular employees, but Tom and his co-investors decided to establish a 
"non-qualified" deferred compensation plan solely for Tom, in order to 
176. The statute, as currently drafted, does not appear to extend the unlimited saving 
account deduction to trusts, but we are assuming that will be corrected in any final draft. 
177. I.R.C. §§ 401-417 contain detailed requirements for qualified plans. The Small 
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, H.R. 3448, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996), makes 
several changes in the pension and retirement area, principally with regard to the 
simplification of"qualified plans". Except for nonqualified deferred compensation plans 
for state and local governmental employees, I.R.C. § 457, the type of plan discussed in 
this Article is not changed. 
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avoid the restrictions on highly paid (''top hat") employees in the regular 
retirement plan. 178 
To give Tom some assurance that he wouid receive the money at 
retirement, the employer, Apple, contributed the deferred portion of his 
salary ($100,000) to an irrevocable trust, administered by an independent 
trustee. The trust was.not specially funded, 179 only the annual deferred 
salary was contributed to it. The deferred compensation plan for Tom 
was in compliance with IRS procedures. Furthermore, in accordance 
with IRS rules, the principal and income from the trust was subject to 
claims of the employer's creditors in the event of the employer's 
insolvency. 180 In effect, the trust funds are deemed owned by the 
corporate employer until Tom's retirement. As beneficiary of the trust, 
Tom had more protection than a mere naked promise to pay his 
compensation at a future time. The trust fund was segregated from the 
corporation's general funds, subject to creditor's rights. 
2. Results Under Current Tax Law 
In contrast to a "qualified" retirement plan, where the Code and 
Regulations contain enormously detailed requirements, the nonqualified 
plan is curiously subject to relatively few requirements. 181 In general, 
qualified plans permit employer and employee contributions to a tax-
exempt trust, in which the income earned by the trust is not taxable until 
distributed to the employee at retirement. With specific dollar limits on 
each type of qualified plan, the amounts contributed by the employer are 
currently deductible from its gross income.182 The employee excludes 
the employer's contribution (as well as her own, in most cases) from 
current gross income, and is not taxed until the amounts are received at 
178. For example,§§ 401(a)(4) and 414(q) provide for disqualification ofa plan that 
discriminates in favor of"highly compensated employees". I.R.C. §§ 40l(a)(4), 414(q) 
(1996). 
179. The nonqualified plan is deemed "unfunded" since the contribution to a trust 
is not vested in the employee and remains essentially an unsecured promise to pay. 
180. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422. This is the model grantor trust for 
unfunded deferred compensation arrangements, popularly known as "rabbi trusts". 
181. The principal provisions applicable to qualified plans are found in I.R.C. 
§§ 401-417 (1996). 
182. The "reasonable" salary limits apply to retirement plan contributions as well 
as to cash remuneration. Id. § 162(a)(l) I.R.C. § 162(m) imposes a $1 million cap on 
certain executive salaries, but the ceiling is lifted when it can be demonstrated (as it 
usually will be) that the employee's salary is based on "performance" factors. 
1527 
retirement or earlier, if permitted. This is, indeed, the largest fringe 
benefit in the current income tax system. The Treasury Department 
estimates a revenue loss in excess of $60 billion per year caused by the 
postponement of Federal income tax on employer-sponsored. qualified 
pension and retirement plans. 183 
In a nonqualified deferred compensation plan, the employer promises 
to hold part or all of the employee's salary until some future event, 
usually retirement. The employee is normally a highly-paid executive 
who is purposely not included in the qualified plan for the regular 
workers, in order to avoid the anti-discrimination rules. 184 However, 
unlike the qualified retirement plan, the employer cannot deduct the 
deferred salary until the employee receives it years later. The company, 
in effect, subsidizes the tax deferral by foregoing a current deduction and 
by paying taxes as the income is earned on the deferred amount. In 
other words, there is no tax-free build up as there is in the qualified 
pension trust. When the nonqualified plan consists of a mere promise 
to pay, "not represented by notes or secured in any way," the Service's 
rulings have long held that there is no "constructive receipt" of income 
for cash method taxpayers. 185 
When, as in our example, the deferred compensation arrangement 
involves the use of a trust, the plot thickens. The requirement that the 
trust not be "funded" means that the contributions to the trust are legally 
owned by the employer-grantor. The employee is deemed to be an 
unsecured creditor and can receive the proceeds of the trust at retirement 
only if the employer remains solvent. It is deemed a contingent promise. 
These trusts are called "rabbi trusts" because of a 1981 letter ruling 
183. Tax Expenditures Chapter From The President's Fiscal 1996 Budget, 66 TAX 
NOTES 1037, 1040 (1995). In one sense, the high cost of this tax subsidy is one of the 
motivating forces underlying the movement to a consumption type tax which broadens 
the savings base beyond tax favored pension plans and the like. However, Congress 
should not adopt a radical or rapid change in the current system without recognizing the 
potential negative impact on the Treasury, the stock market, and the millions of 
American workers. Private pension plans are estimated to have assets of nearly $ 4 
trillion, and account for 20-25% of the total equity in corporations. Lester B. Snyder & 
Jerry G. Gonick, The Interrelationship of Securities Class Action Litigation and Pension 
Plan Tax Policy: What's Really At Stake?, 21 SEC. REG. L.J. 123, 137 (1993); see also 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate 
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1291 (1991). . 
184. Daniel I. Halperin, Special Tax Treatment For Employer-Based Retirement 
Programs: Is It "Still" Viable as a Means of Increasing Retirement Income? Should 
It Continue?, 49 TAX L. REV. 1, 22 (1993). 
185. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174; see also Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 
244 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.451-l(a), 
1.451-2(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-l(c)(l) (application of the annuity rules in § 72 on 
the taxability of receipt by beneficiary). Social security taxes are deductible by the 
employer when the wages are actually or constructively paid. Id. § 31.3111-3. 
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holding that a rabbi of a congregation was not taxable on the principal 
of a trust until he received it at retirement. The rationale used by the 
Service was that the trust assets were subject to the claims of his 
employer's ,creditors and were therefore subject to substantial limitations 
or restrictions. 186 Because of the uncertainty that developed as to the 
proper treatment of these trusts, in 1992 .the. IRS published a "model" 
rabbi trust that would receive "safe harbor" treatment in deferring 
compensation, 187 so that the employee would not be in constructive 
receipt of the assets in the trust until actual receipt in later years. 
Despite the IRS 's reticence in blessing these plans, there has been a 
dramatic growth in the "earn now, pay later" arrangements in the past 
ten or so years, particularly for highly-paid executives in many large 
public companies.188 
If the nonqualified deferred compensation trust is in compliance with 
the Service guidelines,189 Tom and his corporate employer, Apple, will 
have the following tax results: (1) the transfer of the $100,000 of his 
earnings to the employer controlled trust account will not be deemed a 
transfer of property to Tom since it is an· unsecured promise to pay 
money in the future; 190 (2) Apple, as grantor of the trust which was 
established to discharge its legal obligation, will be treated as owner of 
the trust and thus taxable on all the income (less deductions) of the 
trust-the trust itself is not a taxable entity, unless it fails to qualify as 
186. Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 81-13-107 (Dec. 30, 1980). 
187. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422. "Rabbi trusts" reportedly account for as 
much as 70% of nonqualified deferred compensation of highly paid executives at large 
public companies. Halperin, supra note 184, at 22 (citing Lee A. Sheppard, Brisendine 
Provides Rabbi Trust Update, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 247-8, Dec. 6, 1993, available in 
Westlaw, TNT database, 96 TNT 247-8) (A. Thomas Brisendine is an IRS Branch Chief 
in the Employee Benefits section of the national office). 
188. For an interesting article on the use of these plans by specific executives at 
several corporations, see Christopher Drew & David C. Johnson, Special Tax Breaks 
Enrich Savings of Many in the Ranks of Management, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1996, at 1. 
189. It is assumed in our case that since Tom owns only 25% of the Apple stock 
he is not a controlling shareholder of Apple and thus is eligible to defer his compensa-
tion. Rev. Proc. 88-3, 1988-1 C.B. 29. It is further assumed, although not free from 
doubt, that the deferred compensation trust can be permitted to invest its funds in the 
employer's stock without violating the "prohibited transaction" excise tax which was 
raised from 5% to 10% in the recently enacted Small Business Job Protection Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1453, 110 Stat. 1755 (1996). 
190. I.R.C. § 83(a) (1996); Treas. Reg. sec. l.83-3(e); I.R.C. § 402(b). 
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a "rabbi trust"; 191 (3) Tom will not be taxed until he receives payments 
from the trust; 192 and (4) Apple will not be allowed a deduction for the 
deferred compensation until actually received by Tom.193 
Tom's use of the "rabbi trust" results in a gamble that the 
corporation's assets could be seized by its creditors. But the presumed 
conventional benefits of tax deferral, together with the lower corporate 
tax rate (34 percent) on Apple's inclusion of the trust investment income 
on its tax return rather than on the higher rate (39.6 percent) trust tax 
return, make the gamble worth taking under current law at least. An 
added benefit to taxing the investment income to the corporate employer 
(under the grantor trust rules), rather than to the trust or to the employee, 
is the 70-100 percent dividends-received deduction available only to 
corporate shareholders.194 Thus, Tom's $100,000 deferred compensa-
tion, if invested in stocks of other corporations, would result in no more 
than a 10.2 percent tax [34 percent corporate rate x $30,000 net 
dividend] on the dividends received, rather than 39.6 percent if taxed to 
the trust or directly to Tom, had he taken the $100,000 as current cash 
compensation and invested it himself. 195 
3. Results Under the Flat Tax 
As discussed above, in the context of alimony trusts, the flat tax 
proponents tell us that their tax system ignores trusts since it receives 
only after-tax income (income already assessed under the business level 
tax). 196 What then happens to deferred compensation plans such as 
"rabbi trusts"? The answer to that question depends first on how current 
labor compensation is itself taxed. 
The tax treatment of labor under both tax proposals creates problems 
in two broad respects.197 Under the USA tax, employee labor costs are 
not deductible by the business employer, purportedly following the VAT 
policy of not allowing labor cost deductions ( since they are part of the 
191. I.R.C. §§ 673-677; Treas. Reg. § l.677(a)-l(d). If the trust should fail to 
qualify as a "rabbi trust" the income of the trust would probably be taxed at rates higher 
than corporate rates---39.6% for trust taxable income over $7,900 vs. 34% on corporate 
taxable income over $75,000. I.R.C. §§ l(e), 1 l(b). 
192. I.R.C. § 451; Treas. Reg. § 1.451-l(a). 
193. I.R.C. § 404(a)(5); Treas. Reg. § l.404(a)-12(b)(2). 
194. I.R.C. § 243. 
195. Note that the "rabbi trusts" are generally not permitted to invest in the 
employer's stock. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422. For a thoughtful analysis of the 
differences or tax equivalencies between taking current compensation and qualified and 
nonqualified ("rabbi") trusts, see Halperin, supra note 184. 
196. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
I 97. Some of the material in this section is taken from Snyder & Gallegos, supra 
note 3, at 35-37. 
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measure of taxable "value added"). 198 Employees, however, are 
taxable on wages under the USA tax, the same as other income.199 
When labor is not deductible by the employer, the amount paid as 
salaries and wages is in effect taxed at the business level. On the other 
hand, the flat tax allows a labor cost deduction to the business employer, 
but taxes only wages (and no other income) to the employee. 
As for deferred compensation, the flat tax statute expressly allows a 
deduction to the employer for contributions to "qualified" plans.200 
Employer ( and employee) contributions to a qualified retirement plan are 
not included in current taxable income of the employee.201 The 
employee is taxed, as under current law, when the benefits are received 
in later years.202 This is contrary to the normal treatment of other 
investments under the flat tax, in which wages are taxed currently and 
subsequent investment returns are excluded from income. 
The fate of nonqualified deferred compensation plans ("rabbi trusts") 
is not clear under the flat tax. In fact, since trusts are non-existent for 
fiat tax purposes, do the constructive receipt or economic benefit rules 
under current law prevent the use of specially-funded trusts exclusively 
198. While neither proposal attempts to coordinate the separate social security tax 
provisions, there is a novel payroll tax credit, however, under the USA tax. The 7.65% 
payroll tax paid by employers remains intact under both the USA tax and flat tax. Since 
this payroll tax is deductible under current law, there would be an additional tax burden 
under the USA tax with nondeductible salaries and wages. The credit serves as a 
mitigation of that burden, but so long as the tax rate on employers (11 %) exceeds the 
7.65% rate there is still a disparity. The payroll tax credit also applies at the employee 
level. 
199. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
200. H.R. 2060, supra note 1, §§ 1 l(d)(l)(C), 63(c). While claiming to eliminate 
most of the Internal Revenue Code, the flat tax retains most of the detailed requirements 
of the retirement and pension plan rules (however, with considerable simplification in 
the anti-discrimination rules and limits on contributions, consistent with the goal of the 
flat tax to provide incentives to invest). Id. § 106. Unlike the USA tax, S.722, supra 
note 2, §§ 281-283, which provides a credit for social security taxes, the flat tax offers 
no such benefit for public retirement as it does for private retirement plans. The 
underlying policy for the payroll tax credit is discussed in Snyder & Gallegos, supra 
note 3, at 49-50 & n.194. 
201. H.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 1 l(d); HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 64, at 130. 
202. Since the flat tax rate (say, 17%) is applicable to both the company and the 
employee, as well as to compensation received currently and at retirement, the concept 
of deferral itself may require reconsideration in a new "time value of money" regime. 
See, e.g., Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money", 
95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986); Halperin, supra note 184. 
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for executives?203 We should remind ourselves that the federal tax 
reforms do not generally override state law (unless the state consents, as 
in state tax laws).204 Unless some form of human immortality is on 
the horizon, estates and trusts will continue to be created.205 
In those instances when the company arid the employee prefer to defer 
payment of wages to an executive through a fully vested trust (protected 
from creditors of the company), it is not clear whether the flat tax retains 
the constructive receipt provisions.206 The IRS, or similar administra-
tive agency, and the courts would then be required to decide whether 
deferred "wages" are taxed' now or later. If taxed currently, then the 
need to value the portion of wages placed into a trust for later distribu-
tion to the employee triggers complex "present value" calculations.207 
However, interpretations of the flat tax will not necessarily follow 
principles in our present ·· income tax. Indeed, the consumption tax 
precepts favor reinvestment of capital and income. 
But do Tom and his compatriots at Apple really need a deferred 
compensation plan? There may, in fact, be a better way to reduce taxes 
under the flat tax, one which is quite consistent with the goals of those 
advocating its adoption. Remember that "economic growth" is what 
they have in mind. In fact, they want businesses to do exactly what they 
203. See supra note 198. In defining "retirement distributions," the flat tax statute 
refers to tax exempt trusts under I.R.C. § 50l(a) (1996). The reference to "trusts" 
presumably refers to "qualified" pension plan trusts, and acknowledges the existence of 
trusts for some purposes. H.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 63(c)(l). 
204. Michael Mazerov & Dan R. Bucks, Federal Tax Restructuring and State and 
Local Governments: an introduction to the Issues and the Literature, 33 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1459 (1997). 
205. Undoubtedly, articles will be written on the effect of tax reform on state law, 
including community property law, where fundamental rights and obligations are first 
identified. 
206. H.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 63(a)(l)(A) (taxes wages "received during the 
taxable year"). We cannot find any reference to I.R.C. § 451 (or the regulations 
thereunder), which contains the constructive receipt rules. Under current law, as set 
forth above, the contribution by an employer of deferred compensation to an unrestricted 
trust for an employee is deemed constructive receipt. The flat tax purports to "repeal" 
the current income tax law, but retains the pension plan rules in I.R.C. §§ 401-420. H.R. 
2060, supra note 1, § 106(b). It appears, however, that the statute, as now written at 
least, allows an employer deduction only for amounts contributed to specified plans, 
none of which is a nonqualified deferred compensation plan. See id. §§ 1 l(d)(l)(C), 
63(c). The reference to "eligible deferred compensation plan" (as defined in I.R.C. 
§ 457)--which covers only governrnental employees--would indicate that the proponents 
of the flat tax presumed that other nonqualified plans ("rabbi" and regular trusts) were 
taxable currently. Since I.R.C. § 83 is also repealed, as well as the rulings under current 
law holding that transfers to "rabbi" trusts were not completed transfers, the flat tax 
resurrects the valuation and timing issues that § 83 was intended to resolve. 
207. For an example of such a ruling under current law, see Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 92-06-
009 (Nov. 11, 1991). 
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cannot do under current law-plow back the profits into business 
expansion, purchase new equipment, and defer taxing profits, not labor. 
The centerpiece of both the :flat tax and USA tax, under the business 
tax component of these proposals, would allow full deductions for 
"business" assets purchased in the. current year-no depreciation 
schedules or other. recovery of capital concerns, as under current 
law.208 This should be contrasted with the "penalty" tax on accumulat-
ed earnings under current corporate tax law, when a 39.6 percent tax is 
imposed almost exclusively on closely-held corporations, which are 
required to prove that the earnings are retained "for the reasonable needs 
of the business."209 Although the penalty tax may not be a major 
source of litigation, it serves as an inhibiting factor in the growth of 
some small businesses. To illustrate this issue again, as we did in our 
discussion of the Arnes case in Part II of this Article,210 if Tom could 
forego a portion of his salary (that he would have deferred under current 
law) and instead allow it to be retained by the corporation for expansion 
of the business, the consequences to the corporation and Tom would be 
greater after-tax yields. If Tom spends more managerial time at Apple 
than the other investors, stock options211 or dividends from a specially 
created class of stock could provide a higher after-tax return. Thus, the 
portion of Tom's salary which is retained by the corporation is not 
deductible as· such, but the purchase of new assets provides the same 
result. Converting the taxable salary to non-taxable dividends or stock 
. 208. H.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 1 l(d)(2)(A)(i). The deduction is referred to as a 
"business input" for "the amount paid for property sold or used in connection with a 
business activity". Curiously, wages and retirement benefits are deductible from "gross 
active income" under §§ 1 l(d)(l)(B), (C), but are excluded from the definition of 
"business input" by§ 11 (d)(2)(A)(i), along with "personal use" property not connected 
with a business activity. Perhaps this is explained as an attempt at GATT and VAT 
compliance where labor costs are technically part of the value_ added tax base, and thus 
also explaining the rationale for taxing only wages in the component of the flat tax 
which taxes individuals. See Avi-Yonah, Income to Consumption, supra note 136; 
Schenk, supra note 86. 
209. I.R.C. §§ 531, 535(c) (1996). The supposed rationale for this tax is to preclude 
the retention of earnings in a corporation instead of distributing them as taxable 
dividends to the shareholders. 
210. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text. 
211. It appears that stock options are not "cash" wages and thus not taxable on the 
spread between the exercise price and the fair market value of the stock (which should 
increase with expansion of Apple). Compare Stock options under the USA tax, in which 
the purchase of the stock is allowed as a savings deduction. S. 722, supra note 2, §§ 50-
53. 
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options allows both Tom and Apple to avoid taxes ( even though the 
seventeen percent tax rate is applicable to the business and Tom) at both 
the business tax and individual tax levels. This plan may invite "tax 
avoidance" scrutiny by the IRS under current law, but appears affirma-
tively legitimate under the consumption-tax philosophy of the flat tax. 
4. Results Under the USA Tax 
The problems with "rabbi trusts" and other nonqualified deferred 
compensation plans disappear under the USA tax. The employer is not 
allowed to deduct wages, salaries, or other cash payable for services by 
"employees,"212 including contributions to "retirement" plans.21:1 
However, there are a number of tax-deferral options available under the 
USA tax, which are not as readily available under present law. Many 
of these choices allow the employer to be the savings vehicle by holding 
the funds for business use. For example, employees are not taxed until 
they actually receive their salaries, permitting a simple deferred 
compensation contract. If the employee wants protection against the 
employer's creditors, the parties can utilize a funded trust account 
without the need to comply with the "rabbi" trust rules. The key to this 
flexibility is the "unlimited savings account," in which amounts 
contributed to a trust fund, on behalf of an employee ( or by the 
employee himself or herself), are deemed "savings" and, thus, offset the 
inclusion of current salary or other income.214 This applies to all 
retirement plans. In addition, the investment income accumulated in the 
trust fund is not taxed until deemed withdrawn under the net savings 
rules of the USA tax.215 As described above,216 trusts, as such, are 
not taxable entities under the USA tax; beneficiaries are taxed only on 
distributions (other than certain expenses paid by the trust). Thus, if a 
beneficiary receives a distribution and does not re-invest it in conformity 
with the savings rules, the beneficiary will be then taxed on that amount 
as consumption. 
Tom and Apple have considerable flexibility in deferring taxes in this 
context. Tom can receive special dividends on his stock, reinvest the 
212. Payments to "independent contractors" (self-employed businesses) are 
deductible, however. For problems caused by retaining this present law distinction, see 
Snyder & Gallegos, supra note 3, at 47-49. 
213. S. 722, supra note 2, §§ 205(a)(4)(A), 205(a)(4)(D)(i). 
214. Christian & Schutzer, supra note 170, at 1507, 1512-1513. 
215. S. 722, supra note 2, §§ 50-58. 
216. See supra Part III.B.4. 
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dividends with Apple (for more stock), and, in effect, pay no current 
tax.217 Payment of dividends by Apple will not entitle it, however, to 
the payroll tax credit. They can enter into a deferred compensation 
arrangement in which the salary (or a portion of it) is contributed to a 
trust,218 resulting in a net savings deduction to Tom as an offset to his 
deferred compensation. Whether the trust can then purchase the 
employer's stock may be problematic, but it does not appear to be a 
"prohibited transaction" under the more liberal savings rules of the USA 
tax.219 Furthermore, the employer's purchase should be less problem-
atic when, as in the case of Tom, the employee is not a majority 
shareholder of the purchasing company. 
In sum, the net savings deduction refocuses our views on tax planning 
by providing Tom and his employer more intentionally tax-favored 
alternatives. The fact that the business employer receives no deduction 
for compensation-related payments could impact some incentive for 
employer-based pension plans in the future. However, some companies, 
such as Apple, may enjoy more growth and expansion by purchasing 
fully deductible assets. The variables will require careful planning in 
each case, and unlike the flat tax, with one rate for businesses and 
individuals (seventeen percent), the USA tax, with different rates for 
businesses ( eleven percent) and individuals ( eight to forty percent), will 
require even more reliance on accountants and tax lawyers. 
IV. CONCLUSION · 
The flat tax and, to a lesser extent, the USA tax are much simpler than 
the current income tax. Both proposals are a more efficient way to tax 
capital investors-an improvement over the ambiguities inherent in the 
meaning of "capital gains," and an elimination of the never-ending 
217. S. 722, supra note 2, §§ 50-58, 53(b). Individuals can deduct purchases of 
financial assets (such as stock); businesses can deduct purchases of business assets, but 
not financial assets, such as stock in another corporation. Peter L. Faber, Tax Reform 
and Corporate Acquisitions, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1541 (1997). 
218. The taxability of trust income to the employer corporation under the grantor 
trust rules of present law as to nonqualified plans is deemed unnecessary under the USA 
tax, where trusts are generally not taxed, thus perhaps explaining the provision which 
does not permit corporations to· be grantors in grantor trusts. S. 722, supra note 2, 
§ 144. 
219. The model "rabbi trust," under current law, generally prohibits ownership of 
the employer's stock by the trust. See supra note 196. 
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wrangling in Congress on lowering the rates on these gains. The central 
feature of the business tax under both proposals--an immediate 
expensing of business asset purchases-may well accomplish the goal of 
shifting the tax advantage away from labor and retirement compensation 
toward significantly more accumulation of business and investment 
profits. The flat tax creates a new exclusion from taxation of income 
from savings and investment for individuals; the USA tax essentially 
postpones taxation of this type of income. Tax-favored treatment of 
savings thereby becomes the norm of the new tax system, not the 
exception thereto, as under current tax law. Both proposals, however, 
have their own serious flaws. The treatment of borrowed money is only 
partially dealt with under the USA tax, and totally ignored under the flat 
tax. As a result, in a system which puts its main emphasis on the 
assumed distinctions between taxable "consumption" and non-taxable 
"savings," borrowed money can be used for both purposes without limit, 
thus encouraging tax avoidance schemes which are not consistent with 
the policy goals of these proposals. 
The flat tax's failure to recognize the existence of trusts and estates as 
separate entities may, in many instances, represent a simplification of a 
complex Subchapter of the present Code. Yet, with both trust and 
beneficiary exempt from tax, for all time, have they not taken the goal 
to avoid double-taxation too far? Likewise, the USA tax, by imposing 
a tax on distributions to beneficiaries, but not upon the trust entity, has 
neglected to recognize the various types of trusts in this country, many 
of which do not resemble a "savings or brokerage" account. The 
traditional state law distinctions between "corpus" and "income" will be 
more difficult to trace without a centralized entity. 
The elimination of the need for a deferred compensation trust under 
both the flat tax and USA tax can be scored as a simplification. While 
top executives might miss the "rabbi trust," they have many more 
options to defer wages, including the savings deduction under the USA 
tax or the conversion of wages into dividends or stock options under the 
flat tax. But the non-deductibility of labor costs and retirement 
contributions under the USA tax may jeopardize the present $4 trillion 
private pension plan system in this country, if employers decide to 
reduce these benefits for the average worker. 
Critics of these consumption tax proposals label them as nothing more 
than a "wage" tax and a shifting of the tax burden to labor. A closer 
look at the current tax law, however, shows that eighty to eighty-five 
percent of the income tax revenue collected by the government already 
comes from wage and service related income. 
In the final analysis, those of us who have accommodated our life 
styles to the present law should not fear its improvement, or even radical 
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change. Instead of sitting back and assuming that "it will never 
happen," we should assume that such change is a distinct possibility. 
We would be better advised to seriously analyze the new tax proposals 
( and the many more to come) and their impact on international trade, 
small businesses, pension plans, and the stock market. There is a need 
to fashion the most equitable transition from the present system, while 
we examine further strengths and weaknesses in tax reform proposals. 
The flat tax and USA tax require further work, but we do a disservice 
to ourselves in embracing the current income tax which was written for 
a different economic era. 
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APPENDIX 
EFFECT OF BORROWING ON TAX DEFERRAL 
The table below illustrates how borrowed money may be used in a 
business setting to defer taxes even more than apparently allowed under 
the :flat tax proposal as written. The example assumes a 20% tax rate, 
a 10% annual yield on business investments, a 10% interest refurid 
component on loss carryforwards, and a 10% interest rate on the loan 
(thus also eliminating arbitrage effects-which would only exacerbate this 
phenomenon). [This illustration is made using the :flat tax proposal; 
generally, the same illustration could apply to the USA tax as well.] 
The business borrows $100 in year 0, giving the lender a note bearing 
10% interest per year. The loan is paid back in five equal installments 
of $26.38, consisting of principal and interest, beginning at the end of 
year 1. [The business buys new equipment for $ 100 in year 0 in 
preparation for sales beginning in year 1.] The :flat tax allows the 
business to deduct the full $100 purchase price in year 0, the year of 
purchase. (Interest on the loan is not deductible, adopting the VAT 
concepts.) However, assuming that the business has insufficient income 
in year 0, the :flat tax allows the business taxpayer an unlimited 
operating loss carryforward of the unused $100 purchase deduction with 
the addition of an interest refund component of $10, for a total 
carryforward to year 1 of $110. H.R. 2060, supra note 1, sections 
11 ( d)(2)(A)(i). 
Using the new equipment, the business generates $100 in sales in each 
of the five years that the loan is paid back. Variable expenses equal $50 
per year and do not include interest on the loan. The cash remaining 
after the loan payment is made and taxes are paid is shown in the table 
as remaining with the business, but under the :flat tax it could be 
distributed tax-free to the owners. 
The business pays no tax until year 3. However, if the business were 
to reinvest the remaining cash in additional business assets at any time 
through year 3, when it first begins to pay taxes in this example, it could 
augment its tax deferral by creating new loss carryforwards, offering 
expansion opportunities as well. 
The AICPA guide to the consumption tax debate (see supra note 74) 
advocates the exclusion of borrowed money from income on the theory 
that loan proceeds represent the net present value of the cash stream of 
loan repayments (including interest). The table demonstrates this 
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principle. However, when the business uses these loan proceeds to 
generate loss carryforwards that free up cash and defer taxes, it obtains 
a significant benefit from the use of borrowed money, which would 
refute the AICPA's exclusion of borrowed money from the tax base. As 
the table shows, the before tax cash remaining at the end· of year 5 is 
$141.84, and $115.36 after taxes for the entire period. The use of $100 
of borrowed funds produced a net before tax yield of 41.84% and an 
after tax yield of 15.36%. Moreover, the tax paid ($26.48) was deferred 
until years 3 to 5. · 
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ITEM/YEAR YEAR I YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR4 YEARS 
Sales 100 100 100 100 100 
Expenses 50 50 50 50 50 
Gross Profit 50 50 50 50 50 
(sales-exp.) 
Loss Carryfwd 110 66 17.6 0 0 
(+10% int) 
Taxable 0 0 32.4 50 50 
Income 
Tax Paid 0 0 6.48 IO IO 
(20%) 
Remaining 60 16 0 0 0 
Loss 
Carryfwd ,. 




Loan Payment 26.38 26.38 26.38 26.38 26.38 
Cash 23.62 23.62 17.14 13.62 13.62 
Remaining 
Total Cash 0 25.98 54.56 78.87 101.74 




Total Cash on 23.62 49.60 71.70 92.49 115.36 
Hand at End 
of Period 
1540 
